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Tax Systems in Transition Economies
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Robert M. McNab
Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia
I. INTRODUCTION
One-quarter of the world’s population lives in countries going through the largest economic 
experiment in history, the transition from centrally planned to market-based economic systems. 
New market institutions coexist with the remnants of the past economic systems, providing a 
unique challenge to economic reform. The governments of countries with transitional economies 
have been carrying out simultaneous reforms of legal, political, and economic institutions, thus 
there is hardly any aspect of economic policy that is not or has not been on the economic 
reform agenda of countries in transition (CITs).1 Economic reforms range from the privatization 
of markets to decentralization of government finances to dismantling the regulatory influence 
of the state. In most cases restructuring CIT economic systems has brought abrupt declines in 
real economic activity, considerable underemployment, and sharp cuts in government services. 
It is within this difficult environment that the reform of CIT tax systems has been taking place.
Effective reform of CIT tax policies and tax administrations has been widely recognized 
as a key element to the success of the economic transition experiment. All CITs have been 
involved in active tax policy reform. Some started early, in the late 1980s, and some waited 
until 1993-1994. Most of the CITs have also initiated reforms of their tax administration systems, 
but perhaps with less enthusiasm. This process of reforms has also brought the largest experiment 
in tax policy and tax administration design in economic history.
The goal of this chapter is to assess current tax reform in CITs. Although the process of 
reform is far from over, many significant developments have already taken place and it is 
already possible to learn from mistakes and early successes and to apply the knowledge to 
other countries.2
The rest o f the chapter is organized as follows. We start in Section II by reviewing the 
tax systems in centrally planned economies (CPEs).3 The vast majority of revenues came from 
profit taxes, turnover taxes, and payroll taxes paid by the state enterprise sector. The enduring 
legacy of tax systems under central planning is covered in Section III. Many of the failures, 
problems, and idiosyncracies of the reform efforts during the transition can be traced to the 
past, where these tax systems started. The interventionist tradition of socialist planning has 
been hard to shake, and so has the tradition of negotiating tax burdens or customizing the tax 
system (even for individual enterprises). The fact that taxes were for the most pan hidden from 
the population and that there was no system of self-reporting or voluntary compliance but 
rather an atmosphere of distrust toward the public sector, has been partly to blame for the 
poor revenue performance of transition tax systems. The undeveloped tax administrations of 
CPEs have been of little help. The lack of tax administration capacity represents perhaps the 
most significant of the troubling legacies from the past.
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Section IV examines the general direction and timing for tax reform as viewed by western 
economists, who at the beginning of the transition gave advice to CIT governments in different 
capacities. The fundamental question at that time was whether or not CITs should adopt full 
westem-style tax systems or instead adopt transition strategies that would be simpler to adminis­
ter but also more distortionary. Several factors influenced this advice, including the institutional 
and administrative constraints faced by CITs, perceptions about the most appropriate timing 
for different aspects of the reform, and the lessons that could be learned from recent tax reform 
efforts in both developed and developing countries. Section V examines the actual tax policies 
that have been adopted by CITs over the past four to six years. These reforms have been wide- 
ranging, from the introduction of value-added taxes (VATs), excise taxes, and import levies, 
to radical reform in individual and corporate income taxation. On the whole, early advice 
offered by western experts was only partially heeded, and at times completely ignored, but in 
the continuous process of reforms, often continuous to a fault, there has been a convergence 
toward sensible tax structures. This is a judgment tempered by the fact that, as we will see, 
many problems remain in individual countries and in particular taxes. Where progress has been 
markedly slower is in the reform and modernization of tax administrations. There are bigger 
and deeper problems in this area of CIT tax systems, and solution will require significant 
investment of resources and time. Nowadays, the successful reform of the tax system in CITs 
is in most cases still compromised by antiquated and inefficient tax administrations. The last 
section of the chapter offers a summary of the main issues and some concluding thoughts.
II. THE TAX SYSTEM OF SOCIALIST PLANNED ECONOMIES
A. Overview
Most planned economies in Eastern Europe had tax systems based on the system of taxation 
in the Soviet Union (Bakes, 1991). Some differences existed between federal and unitary states 
and also in those countries in which taxation was used early on as a tool for economic 
development, such as in Poland in 1981 and Hungary in 1988. Before the transition, fiscal 
revenues in CPEs came largely from three taxes placed on the state enterprise sector: the profit 
tax, the turnover tax, and the payroll tax. Together these taxes accounted for almost 80 percent 
of tax receipts in Czechoslovakia and Poland and about 50 percent in Hungary. In a comparison 
of tax revenue structures between CPEs and western market economies, Kodrzycki (1993) 
shows that these planned economies raised almost four times more revenue than western 
European nations from the enterprise profit tax, while only raising half as much from individual 
income taxes.4 Taxes were levied primarily on state-owned enterprises due to the emphasis 
on industrial production and the ability of the state to manage production and cash flows. The 
private sector was commonly outlawed and property taxes did not exist.
According to Ickes and Slemrod (1991), central planners did not create large enterprises 
compared to western economies, however, because there was an absence of small enterprises, 
tax administrators did not need to develop the capacity to tax a large number of individuals 
or small enterprises. Furthermore, revenues were concentrated in the largest enterprises, so 
the primary focus of the collection effort was directed at these enterprises.s Services, particularly 
trade and distribution, remained underdeveloped and highly constrained. Although individual 
taxation was relatively unimportant, the state played a major role in mediating between enter­
prises and households through subsidies and transfers, spending at times more than half of 
the gross domestic product (GDP) in this endeavor. On the other hand, administrative ceilings 
on wages were, in effect, 100 percent taxes on individual income.
Although tax administration was underdeveloped in CPEs, several special features of these 
planned economies facilitated tax administration and enforcement (Tanzi, 1993; Balcerowicz and 
Gelb, 1995). First, the relatively small number of taxpayers meant that the state could conduct 
a reportedly 100 percent audit each year to ensure compliance (Kodrzycki and Zolt, 1994). 
Second, restrictions on payment methods and the monopolistic role of the state banks facilitated
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administration and enforcement. Enterprises had to settle their accounts through the state 
banking system, providing the state with an effective mechanism to monitor cash flows and 
collect taxes. Third, the state could and often did retroactively adjust administrative procedures, 
exemptions, deductions, and rates to meet its perceived revenue needs. Finally, the state served 
a dual role as the owner of enterprises and as the tax collector; thus there was little opposition 
to otherwise controversial tax measures.
Two major periods may be identified by taxation systems in CPEs. Under “classical 
socialism,” the taxation system was for the most part just another element of the monetary 
reflection of the real economy, much like the case for prices and wages (McLure, 1990). Real 
resources were directly allocated through the plan and there was no need or purpose to use 
taxation to affect the allocation of resources. Under what Kornai (1992) has termed “reform 
socialism,” for example, after 1968 in Hungary or after 1987 in the Soviet Union, the tax system 
was used as an indirect lever to collect revenues and also to influence economic decisions. 
Nevertheless, reform socialism did not produce substantial changes in the turnover, payroll, or 
profit tax. Any uniform or across-the-economy incentive effects from taxes tended to be muted 
because of the continued ad hoc negotiated nature of most taxes. In fact, the primary method 
to determine an enterprise’s tax liability was the negotiation process. Large or strategically 
important enterprises were able to negotiate relatively more favorable tax liabilities than other 
enterprises. The description below of tax structures in CPEs covers both periods of classical 
and reform socialism.
B. Turnover Taxes
Turnover taxes applied mainly to consumer goods and to some services.6 They were generally 
single-rate levies differentiated by commodity, and at times by type of enterprise. Turnover 
taxes were collected either at the retail or wholesale level, and were often used as a mechanism 
to regulate prices and to support the allocation of resources set in the plan. The tax base was 
usually the differential between the controlled retail price and the producer cost, excluding 
margins for wholesalers and retailers. In practice, several methods were used to calculate the 
turnover tax liability: (1) as the residual from the difference between the retail and producer 
prices; (2) as a fixed amount per unit; or (3) as a percentage of the retail price. The residual 
method was the most common approach. Central planners worked with a pricing system by 
which the final selling price included a markup for the turnover tax, and most consumers did 
not perceive the turnover tax as a separate charge. In those cases in which the controlled retail 
price was less than the producer price, the turnover tax was negative, reflecting the subsidy 
to the consumer. Because the government fixed most prices, some authors have rightly argued 
that turnover taxes in planned socialist economies were actually not taxes but represented 
predetermined margins, or a residual wedge between retail and producer prices (Tait, 1988; 
Gandhi and Mihaljek, 1992).
C. Payroll and Wage (Income) Taxes
All wage and payroll taxes were collected (withheld) at the enterprise level.7 In most cases, 
gross wages, including some fringe benefits, formed the base of payroll and income taxes. 
Allowances or deductions from the tax base were negligible or nonexistent. Employers often 
offered workers a net-of-tax wage.8 Wage policy was used to influence employee behavior, 
but other policies such as fringe benefits, access to good supplies, and restrictions on residential 
mobility likely had a greater impact on employee behavior. The main purpose of wage and 
payroll taxes in CPEs under classical socialism appears to have been to gain flexibility in 
balancing aggregate income with aggregate expenditures, otherwise income taxes could have 
been eliminated and equivalent revenue collected from enterprise surpluses by paying workers 
net-of-tax wages.9
Another unique feature of CPEs was the use of taxes to regulate the size of the wage bill
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of individual enterprises, or more generally, the use of available funds for employee compensa­
tion. First introduced by Hungary in 1968, the excess wage tax (EWT) was levied on the 
differential between the actual and “normative” wage bill, where the normative wage bill was 
usually defined as the product of a multiple of the minimum wage and the number of employees. 
The imposition of an EWT was an attempt to limit the growth of the wage fund, regardless of 
labor market conditions,10 however, in the prereform period the effectiveness of the EWT was 
limited because of ad hoc exemptions, negotiated rates, and taxation of other capture of 
enterprise net profits. This tax was nevertheless an important precedent, since many transitional 
governments have adopted an EWT at some time during the transitional period.
D. Profit Tax
The profit tax was by far the most important tax in the CPEs. The profit tax was used not only 
to accumulate and centralize revenues but also quite often to regulate enterprise income (Bakes, 
1991). While the most common elements in the tax base were gross profits and property 
holdings, the tax base varied industry by industry, and in some cases enterprise by enterprise. 
Deductions and exemptions were ad hoc in nature, nor was it uncommon to have differentiated 
profit tax rates by industry (sometimes by enterprise). Tax rates were typically set at 50 and 
60 percent. Some countries had progressive tax structures with marginal rates as high as 100 
percent (Gandhi and Mihaljek, 1992), however, the actual liability of the enterprise was more 
often the product o f negotiation, especially for this tax, than of the actual application of tax 
law.
Since the state acted not only as tax collector but also as exclusive owner of enterprises, 
profits were actually syphoned out of enterprises in various combinations of exacted dividends 
and profit taxes. The combination was for all purposes irrelevant because the state actually 
customized the final transfer of funds for each enterprise at a predetermined level.
The use of the term pro fit tax  in a CPE may have been quite misleading. The definition 
of gross profits in a CPE was markedly different from its definition in a market economy. In 
CPEs, profits were at times defined as a fixed percentage of production and distribution expenses. 
Most of the time, depreciation rules were poorly defined and capital was assumed to have an 
unrealistically long life, but at the same time, allowing state-owned enterprises to deduct full 
depreciation expenses would have seemed illogical since the rule was that the state provided 
the initial capital without any obligation for repayment. The measurement of the profit tax base 
was further confused by attempts under reform socialism to increase the efficiency of capital 
utilization. Several CPEs followed a policy of mandating a rate of return on the initial capital 
investment, regardless of the profitability of the enterprise."
E. Other Income Taxes
Taxes on income other than enterprise wages and profits raised relatively little revenue in CPEs. 
These were largely schedular taxes falling on wages and salaries earned in the private sector 
and on professional fees and royalties. Individual income taxes were applied to performing 
artists, sportsmen, writers, and some small retailers (Gandhi and Mihaljek, 1992). The base for 
these taxes was net income adjusted for a minimum exemption, other personal allowances, 
and some expenses. Tax rate schedules were highly progressive and designed to penalize 
economic activity outside the state-socialized sector. Tax rates depended on how “socially 
undesirable” each activity was deemed (Owens, 1991a). Kodrzycki (1993), for example, points 
out that Bulgaria’s general personal income tax rate prior to reform was only 14 percent, but 
the rate rose to 50 percent for artists and scholars and to 85 percent for private entrepreneurs.
Across countries, the relative importance of individual income taxes depended, of course, 
on the importance of private (nonstate) activities. While some CPEs allowed limited private 
activity in the liberal professions or small enterprises, stricter regimes controlled the activities 
even of artists, composers, and writers, and the private sector did not exist. Income from capital
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was relatively uncommon in CPEs. Those countries that permitted private property had a 
schedular tax for rental income, most often with confiscatory rates. Interest income was typically 
allowed only on savings accounts in state banks and on government bonds, and the government 
usually controlled the rate of return that implicitly taxed savings (Mut6n, 1992).
F. Import Taxes
Customs tariffs were imposed on goods imported from countries outside the Council of Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA). Tariff revenues typically represented a small portion of total tax 
revenues since planning authorities preferred quantitative restrictions over nominal tariffs to 
regulate imports. Trade within the CMEA was basically bilateral with the Soviet Union. Typically, 
eastern European countries had favorable terms of trade with the Soviet Union. These countries 
could import raw materials at lower than internationally competitive prices from the Soviet 
Union and export manufactured goods to the Soviet Union at higher than internationally 
competitive prices. The wide belief is that most CMEA prices bore little relation to international 
prices or production costs, including opportunity costs. Involvement in— and dependence 
on— the CMEA differed across countries, so that Bulgaria, for example, relied on the CMEA 
more than Hungary. In Bulgaria, non-CMEA imports were merely 1 percent of GDP, while 
taxes and subsidies from the CMEA price equalization mechanism represented 4 percent of 
GDP (Bogetic and Hillman, 1994).
1 . Implicit Taxation
The existence of implicit taxation was mentioned in the previous discussion but it is important 
to address it separately. Implicit taxation in CPEs was as common as explicit taxation. Enter­
prises were often allowed to mark up prices for labor and other production costs that dictated 
the size of the enterprise’s surplus. The state, as owner of the enterprise and resources, could 
then capture part or all of this surplus. The state also had the means to set input prices differently 
for each economic sector and to capture any price differentials. As Kopits (1991) points out, 
administratively set wages were the equivalent of income taxes implicitly set at highly progressive 
rates. The implicit rates were higher the more set wages deviated from marginal productivity. 
Because the state tightly controlled interest rates and capital ownership, implicit taxation was 
also imposed on saving and investment throughout the economy. By rationing the supply of 
consumer goods, the state directed disposable income into savings accounts, where it was 
implicitly taxed due to artificially low interest rates.15
III. THE LEGACY OF PLANNED SOCIALISM STILL PLAGUES 
THE TRANSITION
The values and practices of the past tax system have dramatically defined the path of tax reform 
in transition countries. Several particular features of tax systems in socialist economies need to 
be highlighted to better understand where tax reform stands today in transition economies and 
what difficulties lie ahead.
A. An Interventionist’s Tradition and a High Share of the Public 
Sector in GDP
The role of taxes in CPEs under classical socialism was to raise revenues for public expenditures 
and support the monetary side of the plan. This role was further expanded under reform 
socialism to affect the allocation of resources. Taxes were also used by the state to appropriate 
surpluses in its role as the only owner of capital (Hogan, 1991). The multiple uses of taxes
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reflected the state’s strong intervention and control of society14 and the economy. As we will 
see below, after an initial decrease, the use of tax laws for economic and social engineering 
has been on the increase in the transition, but on a much lower scale.
On the surface, the relative size of the public sector in CPEs was high but not disproportion­
ate. Kodrzycki (1993) shows that for 1988 and 1989 the average share of tax revenues to GDP 
for CPEs was 44 percent, only three percentage points higher than the average in the European 
Community. This figure, however, is misleading, because of the pervasiveness of government 
intervention in CPEs. Besides the different forms of implicit taxation already discussed, govern­
ments used a wide variety of instruments to include all sorts of nontax revenues, “off-budget” 
activities, and extrabudgetary funds in order to achieve planning targets and pursue government 
policies. The separation between the government and nongovernment sectors was often murky. 
For example, state enterprises were in many cases responsible for the provision of public 
social services and capital infrastructure.15 Cross-subsidies were another major form of hidden 
government intervention. A substantial portion of budget subsidies to particular consumer 
groups, such as households or farmers, were financed by the enterprise sector without explicitly 
appearing in the budget.
CITs inherited the demands of a modem social system, not very different from those in 
western European economies, but with a comparatively inadequate system o f revenue collection. 
Despite a strong policy emphasis on constraining fiscal spending (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; 
Balcerowicz and Gelb, 1995), total public expenditures have remained high throughout the 
transition, ranging between 50 and 60 percent of GDP. Keeping fiscal deficits in check has 
required that transitional governments make a significant tax effort, but the causation has also 
been in the other direction, from taxes to expenditures. A case in point is discussed by Aslund
(1992) for Hungary and Poland. Hungary’s high taxes largely began in the early reforms before 
the demise of communism, and the better-performing tax system allowed or induced government 
to keep expenditures high. Poland, on the other hand, reformed the tax system later in transition 
but drastically cut public expenditures first. Reducing the size of the public sector in transitional 
economies has had a direct influence on the quality of tax reform. Governments that have been 
able to reduce the size of the public sector have not been forced as often to implement stop­
gap measures which, while perhaps bolstering collections, may sacrifice other worthwhile 
objectives of tax reform.
B. Customized and Negotiated Taxes
The tax system of CPEs lacked transparency and in many cases liabilities were subject to 
negotiation. Taxpayers did not know what other taxpayers (even those with similar circum­
stances) paid. Negotiation meant that generally there was little systematic relationship between 
statutory tax bases and actual tax liabilities. Negotiation constituted part of the soft-budget 
constraint facing firms and it virtually protected them from bankruptcy risk (Gray, 1991; Kopits 
and Offerdal, 1994; Owens, 1991b).1 On the other hand, the policy of keeping consumer prices 
stable while continuously changing producer prices often left firms unable to pay their liabilities 
immediately (Tait, 1988); this situation also required negotiations. As we saw in the discussion 
of turnover and profit taxes, CPEs commonly used tax rates to determine prices and control 
surplus (profit) margins o f enterprises. Bargaining and negotiation were not only about liability 
but often about which taxes and subsidies firms were subject to (Newberry, 1990). Each country 
used a large number of turnover tax and profit tax rates and subsidies to achieve these objectives. 
The negotiations determined how much was left to alter workers' salaries, pay for additional 
capital, or undertake social expenditures in the community. This proliferation of rates, ad hoc 
exemptions, and negotiated liabilities, clearly meant that the tax systems lacked transparency.
The mixed role of government as tax collector and as owner of tax-paying enterprises 
complicated things. As mentioned, profit taxes were also used to capture income for the state 
in its role as owner o f capital resources. Actually, taxes and other charges approximating rents, 
interest charges, and dividends were used interchangeably by the governments o f CPEs to raise
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public revenues.1 In addition, as owner of capital resources, the state had a free hand in levying 
taxes or distributing capital income to itself retroactively.
The legacy of customized taxes and negotiated payments has continued to limit the 
efficacy of tax reform and tax administration efforts in CITs. The dual role of the state as tax 
collector and owner of enterprises has been a contributing factor to poor revenue performance 
in those CITs in which privatization has lagged behind. Newly established and privatized 
enterprises continue to lobby the state for specific tax relief, and often choose to accrue tax 
arrears as a negotiating instrument. Until recently, governments in CITs had not been able to 
resist these pressures and compromised tax collections. In the case of large state enterprises 
the legacy of negotiation continues for the most part to undermine the tax reform effort in 
many CITs.18 The large arrears and negotiated payments of large enterprises in the Russian 
Federation have figured prominently in the international media over the past year, however, 
the problem of arrears is significantly more complex. It is discussed further in Section V.
C. Taxes Hidden from the Population and Lack of Tradition with 
Voluntary Compliance
In CPEs the populations at large were neither aware of taxes nor had any perceptions of tax 
burdens, since very few individuals actually filed tax returns or paid taxes during transactions 
(Kodrzycki, 1993; Tanzi, 1994). As we have seen, the personal income tax was basically a final 
tax withheld at the source by employers. Turnover taxes, collected at the distribution level, 
were hidden from public view. The same was true, of course, of profit taxes levied on state 
enterprises. The legacy of tax systems in CPEs has included a population totally unaccustomed 
to paying taxes. It is not surprising that as reform progressed and the average citizen was 
explicitly taxed for the first time, there was considerable taxpayer resistance and a propitiatory 
environment and culture for tax evasion.
D. Excess Burdens
Planned economies for the most part had an absence of conventional tax distortions or excess 
burdens (McLure, 1991a, b).19 In a planned economy, resources were allocated according to a 
state-devised plan. Practically all decisions regarding investment were also made by the planning 
agency. Enterprises were restricted to activities outlined in their founding charter. This arrange­
ment left enterprises unable to react despite the nonuniform taxation of different economic 
sectors. Prices, and therefore taxes, ultimately were used only to ration demand.21’ Tax systems 
also were characterized by a lack of certainty and stability, with tax rates continuously changing, 
therefore enterprises, even if free to react, could not reasonably anticipate the tax system’s 
impact on any activity. In short, taxes in CPEs generally had not distortionary effects because 
taxpayers could make no decisions affecting them.
The absence of excess burdens was manifest in other ways. Taxation had little or no 
impact on risk taking because private initiative was severely repressed. Taxation also had 
minimal impact on savings. Many forms of saving or wealth were not common, partially because 
they were not allowed by law. Furthermore, households were not encouraged to acquire savings 
or personal wealth because both were viewed as antagonistic to socialist principles.21 The lack 
of conventional economic effects associated with taxation in market economies was perhaps 
also demonstrated by the fact that tax legislation typically was viewed as less important than 
other legislation on wages, prices, and production (Gandhi and Milhaljek, 1992).
There were exceptions to the absence of excess burdens. In countries such as Hungary, 
for example, early liberalization of the economy occurred and taxes began to be used as 
instruments to pursue the designated goals of the economic authorities. Another exception 
may have been the impact of EWTs on the labor-hoarding practices of enterprises.22
Excess burden losses, or the distortions introduced by the tax system in the economy, 
are often not understood by politicians in charge of tax reform. The lack of concern with
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efficiency issues in the tax systems o f CPEs, to a large extent justified, created an attitude toward 
tax design that has come to haunt the tax reform process in the transition. As we see below, 
very few CITs have been able to internalize the lesson learned elsewhere over the past two 
decades that nonneutral tax measures can do much more harm than good for the efficient 
allocation of resources and for economic growth. Central planning was completely antithetical 
to this general conclusion.
E. Taxes and Income Redistribution
Equality in the distribution of income was, at least nominally, a fundamental objective of CPEs; 
however, the objective of income distribution did not figure prominently in CPE tax policies 
because the planner determined wages and income, and at the same time, private ownership 
of wealth was practically nonexistent. In short, in a system in which incomes were directly 
controlled, taxes were unnecessary to equalize income across individuals (Newberry, 1990; 
McLure, 1991b; Owens, 1991b). Even if the policy maker explicitly wanted to pursue equity 
or distributional objectives with tax policy, it would have been quite impossible. Obtaining a 
distribution of current tax burdens would not have made much sense because there was not 
one common or stable set o f applicable tax rules.
It was not a well-kept secret, however, that real incomes may not have been very equally 
distributed. Although wages were administratively set with small differences in rates and social 
services were supposedly provided free to everyone, it was access, not income, that determined 
an individual’s consumption possibilities, and access, it appears, was not at all equally distrib­
uted.23
Regardless of differences in real incomes due to differences in access, a legacy from the 
past system may have been expected to be a belief in the desirability of compressed nominal 
wage and income structures. As the transition to a market economy continues, the dispersion 
in nominal wages and income has invariably increased. During the transition, policy makers 
and tax administrators have expressed concerns about the growing income disparity, 24 but as 
we will see below, distribution objectives have played a small role in CIT tax reform efforts so 
far.
F. Undeveloped Tax Administration
Perhaps the most conspicuous feature o f tax systems in CPEs was an unsophisticated tax 
administration system. The majority of tax inspectorates were local organs and were primarily 
engaged in cash management (Tanzi, 1991). Tax inspectorates were organized by tax, and 
inspectors were often assigned to specific enterprises. Compliance was ensured due to the 
ability of the tax inspector to track cash flows through the state banking system. Auditing was 
a routine adding and checking function. Since production, prices, and wages were known 
parameters, audit tasks were relatively simple and there was no need to use third-party informa­
tion. Tax arrears were mostly anticipated and routinely occurred when the state set the controlled 
retail price below production costs. In addition, the centralization of economic activity allowed 
tax administrators to focus primarily on a small number of large enterprises.
An unsophisticated tax administration apparatus was logically rational in the institutional 
environment of CPEs, however, this legacy left CITs dramatically unprepared to enforce taxes 
once the institutional environment switched to that of a market economy with private property, 
multiple payment systems, and a manifold increase in the number of taxpayers.
G. Public Distrust in Government Institutions
An undeveloped tax enforcement apparatus was only part of the troubled legacy in tax enforce­
ment. The failure of economic policies in CPEs and the privileged status of those in power
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bred widespread cynicism among the populations. In CPEs, there was a widespread belief that 
the bureaucracy was inherently corrupt (Kornai, 1990). This cynicism may have been more 
pronounced in those countries in which the population felt occupied by a foreign power— the 
Soviet Union. At any rate, cynicism kept pace with the rapid growth of the unofficial, or 
underground, economy, in which goods and services were available outside the government's 
purview.25 The combination of the public’s belief in corrupt government, no history of voluntary 
taxpayer compliance, and the growing importance of the underground economy left fertile 
ground for tax evasion on transition economies (Ickes and Slemrod, 1991; Newcity, 1991).
IV. THE GENERAL DIRECTION FOR REFORM
A. Designing a Tax System for Transition or Adopting a Modem System
The transition to a market economy posed hard economic questions to the new governments. 
In the fiscal area a fundamental question posed early on was what type of tax structure to 
adopt. The main choices were to replicate a modern tax system or to develop a tax system 
that could be more optimally adapted to the peculiarities of transition economies.* The first 
approach to tax reform in transition economies could be described as a “big-bang” approach, 
putting in place a tax system patterned after those in market economies. The second approach 
represented a more evolutionary or stepwise reform, gradually moving toward an ideal structure, 
but in the interim being more realistic about administrative and institutional constraints and 
also being concerned about the macroeconomic implications of substantial fiscal deficits that 
may arise from too ambitious a pace of reform.27
From the start of the transition a goal shared by many CITs was to attain a modem tax 
system not unlike those in Western Europe or in North America. This desire was even stronger 
in those transition countries hoping to join the European Union (EU), however, also early on, 
international experts warned against the dangers of mere replication of western tax systems. 
McLure (1991b) and Tanzi (1992, 1993a, 1994) give several reasons why CITs should not 
duplicate western tax systems. In the first place, some western nations have poor tax policies. 
Transition countries should actually learn from these mistakes, not imitate them. More important, 
western economic systems characterized by stable prices and employment differed considerably 
from those in CITs. Similarly, the institutional framework of western countries included complex 
legislation and accounting rules that were very different from those that CITs had inherited 
from the previous regime. It was clear that these differences should be reflected in the respective 
tax systems. In addition, merely legislating a western tax system is very different from enforcing 
it. CITs had to consider the limited capabilities of their tax administrations vis-3-vis those in 
developed nations (Kodrzycki and Zolt, 1994; McLure, 1995a, b). Because the institutional 
background, economic structure, and administrative capabilities also differed among CITs, 
expert advice emphasized the need to develop tax systems that adapt to meet the particular 
needs of each country in transition (Bird, 1992; Bogetic and Hillman, 1994).
B. Tax Reform Constraints
What type of tax system to adopt during the transition was in part determined by the constraints 
facing policy makers. The transitional environment, on average, was not conducive to radical 
transformation of the tax system. Rampant inflation, industrial decline, increasing inequality, 
and a rapid increase in criminal activity all presented obstacles to the tax reform effort, but 
important institutional constraints, including the necessary reduction of the role of the state, 
the decline in production among state-owned enterprises, the weakness of tax administration, 
the lack of modern or western accounting practices, the lack of a tradition of voluntary compli­
ance, and the threat of massive evasionary behavior overwhelmingly tipped the advice in favor 
or evolutionary and country-specific tax reform efforts in transitional economies. Ignoring the 
specific transitional environments would only exacerbate the anticipated problems in revenue
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performance (Hussain and Stern, 1993; Kopits and Offerdal, 1994; McLure, 1991b; Owens, 
1991b; Tanzi and Shome, 1993; Shome and Escolano, 1993; Gray, 1991). On the other hand, 
there was not much pressure to harmonize tax systems across CITs. If anything, their economies 
were now moving apart. While competition for foreign direct investment, for example, would 
impose constraints on how far a country’s tax system could deviate from the norm of those in 
neighboring transition countries, there was little pressure to strive for a uniform system across 
transition economies. The only exception was the significant continuation of trade in Russia 
and the other former Soviet republics (excluding the Baltic States). All of these countries actually 
adopted an origin m ethod  for the VAT for trade among themselves, and the more conventional 
destination m ethod  for trade with other countries. Those CITs desiring to enter the EU adopted 
EU-style VATs, probably prematurely.
Was the advice offered by western experts heeded? Did CITs opt for interim tax systems 
better adapted to their constraints rather than putting into place some carbon copy of a model 
western tax system? As we will see in Section V there were a variety o f approaches, which at 
times came close to transplanting western tax systems. For the most part, however, CITs 
embarked on a reform process that explicitly recognized at least some of the constraints they 
were facing.
C. The Timing of Tax Reform
Was there a most desirable timing for the reform of tax systems in CITs? Even though there 
was general consensus on the desirability of a more evolutionary approach to tax reform in 
CITs, there were also risks associated with this approach. First, a slower and more evolutionary 
approach to tax reform would likely make comprehensive tax reform more difficult to implement 
in the future. As privatization and market reforms proceed, vested interests would emerge 
independent of the state that could slow down or block fundamental reform. This problem 
was evidenced, for example, by large quasi-private entities in Russia, where these vested 
interests began lobbying (a continuation of the old negotiation culture) for specific tax relief 
and may have been successful in delaying important aspects of the reform. The second risk 
was that continuous tax reform would deprive CITs of the stability and certainty needed to 
stimulate domestic entrepreneurship and to attract foreign investors. Continuous changes in 
the tax structure would likely provide more opportunities for tax evasion and confuse tax 
administrators and honest taxpayers alike (McLure, 1991a; McLure, Martinez-Vazquez, and 
Wallace 1997). As we will see in Section V, this risk of too much instability in the tax structure 
creating an uncertain environment did actually materialize in many CITs.
D. The Content of a Transition Tax Structure
What should be the nature of an interim transition tax system? Tax experts were unanimous 
on at least one recommendation: give first priority to the improvement and modernization of 
the tax administration and to the introduction of western accounting practices. It was also 
widely recognized, however, that effective administrative reform would take considerable time 
to permeate the tax system. In reality, the focus and first priority in most CITs was on tax policy 
reform, leaving behind, sometimes a very low priority, the reforms of the accounting system 
and the modernization of tax administration. These two issues are discussed below.
The advice of tax experts on the substance of a transition or interim tax structure was 
based on the recognition of the different types of constraints and limitations present in the 
transition. Emphasis was placed on the adoption of taxes that could be enforceable (Ickes and 
Slemrod, 1991) and those with the breadth to reduce the volatility of tax revenues (Hussain 
and Stem, 1993). In this vein, Kornai (1990) advocated a tax system for Hungary that would 
exclude a western-style personal income tax because attempts to enforce a personal income 
tax could require the revival of a police state. Kornai advocated a system with four main taxes: 
(1) a linear consumption tax, (2) a linear payroll tax, (3) a linear profit tax, and (4) customs
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duties. McKinnon (1991), Cnossen (1991), and Hussain and Stern (1993) suggested the early 
adoption of a western-type destination-based VAT applied at a uniform rate with very few 
exemptions, emphasizing the compliance advantages of a VAT.
More complete blueprints for transition tax structures were offered by McLure (1991a) 
and Shome and Escolano (1993). McLure (1991a) also advocated the early development of a 
VAT, because o f its relatively simpler administration vis-5-vis income taxes, and because of its 
revenue yield, potential, and stability. McLure also argued that the corporate income tax should 
be introduced early in the reform to establish a more certain environment for domestic and 
foreign investors, but that no attempt should be made initially to link corporate and personal 
income taxation. Existing schedular individual income taxes should be kept in place, largely 
withheld at the source, and should have minimum adjustments for household circumstances 
McLure also advocated the introduction of excise taxes on traditional goods early in the reform 
process because of their substantial revenue potential, easy administration, and relative eco­
nomic efficiency.30 Shome and Escolano’s (1993) blueprint for an interim tax structure during 
the transition included, the following elements, among others: (1) a broad withholding tax on 
wages, interest, and dividends; (2) extraordinary tax bases, to include an excess wage tax for 
companies in the state sector; (3) multiple excise taxes on a wide range of goods and services; 
(4) a rudimentary VAT implemented at the importer-manufacturer level; (5) relatively high 
rates of import duties and temporary continuation of export duties; and (6) land taxes for urban 
and rural land.
In all, the advice offered by western experts for designing a tax system for the transition 
coincided in suggesting the early introduction of new indirect taxes, including a VAT and 
excises; the elimination of export taxes and the lowering of import taxes; and the delayed 
introduction of a modern westem-style global income tax on individuals and, rather, the 
continued schedular income taxes with withholding at the source. There was less consensus 
on what form of corporate income taxation should be introduced and how much CITs should 
rely on levies on international transactions. In addition, there was little attention paid to how 
to deal with the effects of inflation in the measurement of income from capital (McLure, 1991c). 
As we will see in Section V, this advice was only partially heeded in the tax reform packages 
adopted by CITs over the past five years.
E. What Are the Lessons from the Western Model?
Most market economies subjected their tax systems to radical reforms during the 1980s.31 The 
general tenor of these reforms has been to simplify the structures of income taxes by flattening 
rates and widening the tax base, in many cases to introduce broad-based VATs on the consump­
tion of most goods and services, and to increase excise tax rates. The broadest tax policy 
objectives, not always achieved, were to reduce economic distortions, to equalize conditions 
among economic agents, and to simplify the tax system. This worldwide reform movement 
sprang up as a reaction to the belief in the 1960s and 1970s that policy makers could pick 
winners and could direct economic growth in market economies by using tax policies to affect 
relative prices (Messere, 1995).32 These experiences no doubt influenced the policy advice 
given to CITs, although some recognized the short-run necessity of retaining distortionary and 
undesirable taxation.
From the western model CITs learned what to strive for (and what to avoid) in tax reform 
in the long run. The broad lines for CIT tax reforms in the long run would include: introducing 
a wide-ranging global personal income tax with a simplified structure; shifting emphasis from 
enterprise income taxation to personal income taxation; integrating corporate and personal 
income taxes; introducing a broad-based VAT and excises on selected commodities; keeping 
and enhancing traditional excise taxes; introducing some type of property tax at the subnational 
level; shifting the taxation of oil and other natural resources from production to profit bases; 
eliminating levies on exports; and using a low and narrowly dispersed import tariff only for 
moderate protection purposes.
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F. Are There Lessons from the Developing Countries’ Experiences with 
Tax Reform?
Because of significant differences in departure points of CITs and developing countries (Ed­
wards, 1992; Kolodko, 1993), the immediate application of experiences of developing countries 
to tax reform in CITs is not advisable (McLure, 1992); however, there are also similarities, and 
it is possible to find useful experiences.54 Many markets and tax administrations are poorly 
developed in both transition and developing countries, and neither has a strong tradition of 
voluntary compliance such as exists in most western market economies. Most transition econo­
mies, like many developing economies, suffer from low revenues and pressing expenditure 
needs. Those conditions may demand in both sets o f countries that securing tax revenue take 
precedence in the short run over other desirable goals of a tax system.
Several concrete experiences with tax reform in developing countries may carry useful 
lessons for CITs:
• Indirect taxes are typically much easier to legislate in an acceptable format and also 
much easier to enforce than direct taxes. During transition, therefore, indirect taxes 
may have to play a more important role in generating revenues than may be desired 
in the long run (Hussain and Stern, 1993).
• Property taxes and property tax administration are difficult to develop in any shape 
or form that makes them significant revenue producers. Although CITs should develop 
these types of taxes, there is little promise that they will become an important source 
of revenue for subnational governments any time in the immediate future.
• Successful efforts to raise revenues in developing countries have relied on widespread 
withholding presumptive taxation methods and alternative minimum taxes. These 
experiences are directly applicable to transition economies (Ickes and Slemrod, 1991).
• Traditional excise taxes are good revenue producers and are relatively simple to 
administer. Their relative good performance in developing countries should be re­
peated in CITs.
• It can be costly to ignore the impact of rapid inflation in the measurement of income 
from capital.
• The banking system can be used successfully to facilitate certain areas of tax administra­
tion such as collections and lower taxpayer compliance costs.
G. Development of the Tax Administration
The most important handicap for CITs early on was the lack of a tax administration system 
capable of enforcing taxes in a free market setting and generating adequate amounts of revenue. 
As we have already mentioned, without exception, studies of tax systems in transition economies 
recommended strengthening and developing the tax administration apparatus independently 
of the path taken for policy reform. Early work on the tax systems of transition economies 
revealed weaknesses in existing tax administration systems and their inability to enforce a 
modem tax system (Bakes, 1991; Gray, 1991; Tanzi, 1991,1993). Major institutional weaknesses 
of tax administrations in CITs included the following:
• A lack of familiarity with standardized treatment and homogeneous rules for all tax­
payers
• A lack of skills and experience with market-oriented taxes and tax administration 
techniques, despite the fact that the existing bureaucracy was experienced
• Stagnant resources and woefully inadequate training and equipment to deal efficiently 
with a large increase in the number of taxpayers
• A lack of adequate salaries for tax collectors to attract and retain quality personnel 
and to discourage dishonest behavior
• A lack of speed in adopting new approaches in enforcement and restructuring responsi­
bilities along functional lines
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• A lack of information systems with computerized records for registration and collec­
tions, and in many cases the lack of taxpayer identification systems
• A lack of manuals and techniques for effective audit of private enterprises
• A lack of understanding of market economies
The weakness of tax administration systems was aggravated by two factors. First, many 
CITs did not have customs services or, if they did, they were understaffed and undeveloped. 
When they work properly, customs services collect not only customs duties but also and more 
important, VAT and excises on imported goods at points of entry. Customs services can also 
provide valuable third-party information for enforcing tax compliance with domestic taxes. 
Second, the effective enforcement of taxes was made more difficult by the lack of modem 
business accounting standards and invoicing practices. Tax enforcement agencies were also 
confronted with the fact that they needed to take over the collection functions previously 
performed by state-owned banks but without having had the time to develop alternative 
collection systems, such as contracting with private banks. The transformation of the tax bases 
resulting from the transition from a CPE to a market economy also presented a complication. 
The viability of large state enterprises, the traditional taxpayer in CPEs, was compromised by 
increased competition, constrained demand, restructuring, and the end of subsidies and available 
cheap credit. The allegiance of regional and local tax offices of the new national tax administra­
tions to the local authorities also very likely compromised collections. The collapse of CMEA 
also contributed to the decline in enterprise revenues and profit tax collections. It does not 
come as a surprise that the transition reform period has been accompanied by an erosion of 
tax revenues in practically all CITs (Balcerowicz and Gelb, 1995; Tanzi, 1994).
The unpreparedness of tax administration systems in CITs called for particularly cautious 
approaches to those areas in which tax policy and tax administration overlap (Ickes and 
Slemrod, 1991; McLure, 1995b; Tanzi, 1993; Cnossen, 1991). Special measures that have been 
recommended include the following:
• Elevating the status of many tax administration issues by including the most important 
of them in the tax law
• Keeping the number of tax returns in the early stages of reform low by establishing 
final withholding of income taxes for most wage earners and by maintaining relatively 
high exemption thresholds for business
• Securing compliance of the VAT by integrating it with the administration and enforce­
ment of a business income tax
• Linking when possible taxes and explicit benefits from government services
• Strengthening the mechanisms of withholding at the source by business enterprises
• Reducing the risk revenue instability by avoiding heavy dependence on any single 
source of revenue
• Using presumptive taxation whenever the application of an ideal tax base is not 
measurable and cannot be monitored
V. CURRENT SYSTEMS OF TAXATION
This section reviews the current systems of taxation adopted in CITs as of mid-1996 and some 
of the history of tax reforms during the transition.” The process of tax reform tends to be 
different in every country and tends to have a marked impact on the final outcome. We start 
this section with a description of some of the peculiarities of the process of tax reform in CITs 
and then proceed with a description of the tax structures by main type of tax. In the last part 
of the section we examine current tax administration and enforcement issues.
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A. The Process of Tax Reform in Transition Countries
The process for tax reform in CITs has been more complex then in other countries because of 
CIT peculiarities related to what we call the “legacy” of planned socialism. Without repeating 
here the details of those legacies (described in Section III), we describe several other features 
that have had an impact on the process o f reform over the past five years.
First, the tax reform effort in CITs was initially hampered by finance ministries’ difficulty 
in asserting their views. Traditionally, the role played by the ministry of finance in planned 
economies was secondary to that of other ministries, such as planning or economy, and to 
sectoral economic ministries. This problem has been solved slowly as the ministries of finance 
have become the dominant protagonists o f fiscal policy (Tait, 1988).
Second, tax reform in CITs necessarily involved an increase in perceived (if not effective) 
tax effort. Under CPEs, we recall, most taxes were not visible in any way to taxpayers. This 
made it much harder for governments to win political and popular support for tax reform. In 
fact, some countries did take measures to soften the expected opposition from taxpayers to 
tax reform. For example, when the new individual income tax was introduced in Poland in 
1992, the government raised gross wages and pensions by amounts corresponding to the lowest 
tax rate of 20 percent. The goal was to leave after-tax income unchanged for most of the 
population (Kodrzycki, 1993).
Third, passing new legislation and enforcing it was made more difficult because of the 
newfound confrontation between government and state enterprises, who earlier had acted as 
partners. Due in part to the importance of state enterprises in transition economies and attitudes 
left over from planned regimes, government authorities in CITs have oscillated between extract­
ing additional revenues from this sector through discriminatory taxation and providing state 
enterprises with continued special tax treatment, subsidies, or condoning of tax arrears.36
Fourth, the breakup of authority and the process of institutional and political reform 
created uncertainty among state institutions regarding who had the rights to or legal ownership 
of particular revenue sources and such assets as natural resources.37 A clear example was 
provided by the fact that under the system of “labor management,” in most state enterprises 
workers could vote themselves higher wages, and thus lower taxable profits. Many CITs tried 
to control the erosion of enterprise profits and assets by penalizing wage increases through 
full or partial elimination of wages from enterprise income and by introducing EWTs.38
B. Direct Taxation
As of mid-1996, practically all CITs had the three pillars of a modern system of direct taxation: 
an enterprise profit tax, an individual income tax, and a payroll or social security tax. Until 
recently, it was common for many CITs not to allow the full deduction of wages or to have 
an EWT paid by enterprises. Although some western countries considered the idea of a similar 
type of tax at the center of the discussion over income policies during the 1970s, for example 
the tax-based income policies (TIPs) in the United States, EWTs are exclusively a CIT phenome­
non. In this section we review the current structure of direct taxes, including EWT, together 
with some of the history of reform for these taxes during the transition years.
C. Enterprise Profit Tax
In 1989 Hungary and Poland were the first two countries to reform the Soviet-inspired enterprise 
profit tax. Many other CITs were slow in following this lead. For example, most of the Central 
Asia CITs, Ukraine, and Belarus waited to start these reforms in earnest until 1994 or 1995 and 
in the interim continued to use the tax structure inherited from the Soviet Union. The process 
of reform for this tax has often been torturous and has not always yielded the desirable results, 
as judged by the standard principles of tax policy,39 but to be fair, the taxation of enterprise 
profits raises an array of complex issues for which there are no best-practice or standard
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answers. Most western tax systems continue to struggle with some of these issues. As we see 
below, the approaches followed in CITs to the taxation of enterprise profits are also quite 
diverse. Perhaps the most important difference with current western tax systems is the CIT 
predisposition to use the tax code to promote or guide certain types of investment activities 
through either tax incentives and holidays or differential tax rates, however, even here the 
recent trend among CITs has been to follow the lead of western tax systems to provide a more 
level field for business activities across all sectors of the economy (OECD, 1995b).
1. Tax Rates
The general rates of the enterprise profit tax are moderate and often below those in western 
tax systems (Table 1). They range from 20 percent (Georgia) to 50 percent (Tajikistan).40 Out 
of twenty-five CITs, five have a rate of 25 percent and another five have a rate of 30 percent. 
Russia’s current general rate is 35 percent.41 These are significant changes from the enterprise 
profit taxes in CPEs, which had rates as high as 85 percent. The trend over the past several 
years in most CITs has been toward lower tax rates.
With the exception of the Baltic countries, all the CITs in the newly independent states 
(NIS) have a separate and higher rate for banks and insurance companies, up to 55 percent in 
Ukraine. Other special treatments include lower rates for agricultural producers, small busi­
nesses, and joint ventures, and higher rates for gambling and some intermediary activities.
2 . Tax B ases
The tax base o f the enterprise income tax is typically calculated as the difference between 
taxable incomes and allowable expenses. One country, Croatia, significantly deviates from this 
rule. In Croatia the tax base is the difference in the net worth of the firm at the beginning and 
the end of the year, adjusted for several factors such as new capital contributions and excessive 
management payments (Martinez-Vazquez, 1995; Schmidt, Wissel and Stockier, 1996; Martinez- 
Vazquez and Boex, 1996a).
The calculation of the tax base of the enterprise profit tax in CITs has undergone profound 
transformations since 1991. Early on, it was common in many CITs to limit all kinds of deductions 
from enterprise revenues, including wages, capital depreciation, and interest. For these reasons 
the tax was known in countries such as Russia as the enterprise in com e  (rather than profit) 
tax. Most CITs currently allow the deduction of costs incurred in the generation of taxable 
income, however, many of the CITs still disallow the deduction of important expenses, which 
in western tax systems are regarded as perfectly legitimate deductions. For example, interest 
costs on long-term loans are not deductible in Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan; 
and Moldova’s enterprise income tax does not allow the deduction of labor costs for banks 
and insurance companies (Table 1).
A more common occurrence is to limit the deduction of certain kinds of costs incurred 
in the production of income.43 In many instances these limitations go beyond sensible administra­
tive measures (e.g., entertainment and travel expenses). Production and operation expenses 
that are still subject to limitations include labor costs, interest costs, expenses in research and 
development or environmental protection, and advertising (Table 1). Other awkward limitations 
exist on the deductibility of production expenses. For example, Bulgaria limits the deduction 
for capital expenses up to the level o f profits in a particular year, thus enterprises with losses 
or zero profits are not granted a capital expenditure allowance in that year. These measures 
surely affect enterprise decisions on the type of technology or method of production used. The 
created distortions unnecessarily violate the tax policy principle of economic neutrality and 
add to the overall burden of taxation.
The norm among CITs is to allow the carry-forward of losses for a period of five years; 
however, in some countries, such as in the Central Asia group, carry-forward provisions are 
limited to joint foreign ventures. Out of twenty-five countries, five have no carry-forward 
provision (Table l) .44 None of the CIT enterprise profit taxes provides for the carry back of
Table 1 Enterprise Profit Tax
Country Basic rate Other rates Limits on deductions
Nondeductible
expenses
Loss carry 
forward (back) 
in years Tax incentives
Foreign investor 
incentives
Albania
Armenia
Azerbijan
Belarus
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech
Republic
30%
12-30%
progressive
25-35% 
progressive 
35% after 
500,000 
rubles
30%
40%
25%
39%
40% tourist activi­
ties; 50% min­
eral/energy ex­
traction 
45% banks/insur­
ance; 70% gam­
bling
45% banks/insur­
ance; 70% gam­
bling; 15—45% co­
operatives
15% small business; 
44% banks/insur­
ance; 60% gam­
bling; 50-80% 
auctions/leasing 
30% small business; 
50% banks/insur­
ance 
None
25% investment, 
share, pension 
funds
Entertainment ex- Employee fringe
penses; interest benefits 
expenses3
Environmental pro- Long-term bank
tection; R&D loan interest
Some labor costs; 
environmental 
protection; R&D
Labor costs; envi­
ronmental pro­
tection; R&D
Medical care inter­
est; Capital ex­
penses' 
Entertainment and 
travel expenses 
Lease payments; ex­
cessive interest; 
travel expenses
Long-term bank 
loan interest ex­
cept joint ven­
tures;' expenses 
not specified in 
the law 
Employee bonuses; 
housing allow­
ances; long-term 
bank loan in­
terest 
Enterprise reserves
Bonuses; excessive 
interest 
Entertainment ex­
penses
3(0)
5 (0) for 
joint ventures 
onlyc
5 (0) for 
joint ventures 
only'
None
5(0)
5(0)
7(0)
Special activity rein­
vestment activi­
ties
Small business1"
2- or 3-year new 
businesses ex­
emption; in­
creased pro­
duction'1 
2-year geographical 
exemption; in­
creased produc­
tion;11 small busi-
Reinvestment activi­
ties; profits used 
for social activi­
ties tax exempt
Some agricultural 
production tax 
exempt
None
5-year exemption 
for certain energy 
producers
None
2-year tax exemp­
tion; 50%' or 
70%' of basic rate 
thereafter
2-year tax exemp­
tion;' 3-year ex­
emption with 
10% rate if lo­
cated in moun­
tain region
3-year tax exemp­
tion'
None
None
None
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Estonia
Georgia
Hungary
Kazakstan
Kyrgyzstan
26% 4% general insur­
ance; 1% life, 
pension, health 
insurance 
20% 0% agricultural ac­
tivities; 10% in­
dustrial/manu­
facturing; 35% 
banks; 60% enter­
tainment; 70% 
gambling
18% declared 
profits; 23% 
distributed 
profits
30%
35%
10% agriculture; 
45% foreign 
branch offices 
45% banks; 55% in­
surance; 70% 
gambling
Fixed asset costs; 
entertainment 
expenses
No information
Excessive interest; 
lease payments; 
consultancy fees
Interest payments
Environmental pro­
tection; social ser­
vice labor costs
Latvia 25% Bank interest; bad 
debts
Gifts
No information
Nonentrepreneur- 
ial expenses
Exchange market 
losses; private ex­
penses 
Expenses not al­
lowed for in the 
law
5(0) None None
5(0) 1-year exemption, 2-year exemption,
with 50% rate re­ followed by 50%
duction in follow­ rate reduction for
ing 2 years; 10- 4 years;® 2-year
100% allowances exemption ;h
for profits rein­ 100% foreign-
vested in indus­ owned firms ex­
trial equipment, empt until initial
technology, and investment re­
certain social proj­
ects
couped
Unlimited in Accelerated depreci­ 85% liability reduc­
first 3 years; ation; interest al­ tion for offshore
5(0) lowance for in­ companies
thereafter vestment
5(0) 20% basic rate if 
registered in free 
economic zone
None
5 (0) for 10% basic rate on 30% basic rate on
joint ventures 
only;'
1 (0) 
otherwise, 
within limits
reinvested profits joint ventures'
5(0) Small businesses 
pay 80% of calcu­
lated tax
None
0continued)
T
ax 
S
ystem
s 
in 
T
ra
n
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E
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9
2
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Table 1 Continued
Country
Lithuania
Moldova
Poland
Romania
Russia
Basic rate Other rates Limits on deductions
29% 10% agriculture Donations to cul­
tural, social funds
15-32% 10-50% coopera- No information 
progressive tives; 25% insur­
ance; 40% banks;
70% excess 
profits
40%
38%
35%
25% agriculture; 
60% gambling
Advertising; R&D
Interest expenses; 
advertising; pub­
lic relations
43% banks/insur- Bank interest;
ance intermedi­
ary activities; 70% 
video rental; 90% 
gambling
travel/entertain­
ment; certain ad­
vertising and mar­
keting expenses; 
R&D; charitable 
donations
Loss carry
Nondeductible forward (back) Foreign investor
expenses in years Tax incentives incentives
Expenses not re­
lated to produc­
tive activity
Labor costs for 
banks and insur­
ance companies
Director’s fees
Expenses not re­
lated to activity 
and not specifi­
cally allowed 
Interest on inter­
company loans; 
voluntary prop­
erty insurance; 
certain em­
ployee benefits, 
including bo­
nuses
None
None
3 (0) in equal 
installments 
5 (0) for large 
enterprises 
3 (0) for small 
enterprises 
5 (0)
Capital/profit rein­
vestment; small 
business start-up 
allowance1
Maximum basic 
rate of 30% and 
accelerated de­
preciation in free 
trade zones; in­
vestment deduct­
ibility in certain 
sectors 
Geographic invest­
ment allowance 
None
Small business;1 In­
vestment for 
expansion of pro­
duction for cer­
tain sectors; 50% 
rate reduction for 
banks/insu ranee 
companies in ag­
ricultural section1
3-year exemption 
and 50% reduc­
tion for next 3 
years for joint 
venture0 
1-6 year exemption 
for qualifying 
joint ventures'
None
5-year tax exemp­
tion for exporting 
joint ventures
2-year federal tax 
exemption; 75% 
rate reduction in 
third year, 50% 
rate reduction in 
fourth year”
Slovak
Republic
Serbia
Slovenia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
40% Travel expenses;
lease payments; 
interest in excess 
of debt/equity ra­
tio; advertising 
25% Ecological ex­
penses; promo­
tional expenses
25%
50% 25% farms, small en­
terprises; 55% 
bank/insurance
Labor costs; enter­
tainment ex­
penses 
Labor costs; envi­
ronmental pro­
tection; R&D
25% 30% small business,
banks/insurance; 
60% gambling
30% 55% banks/insur­
ance; 60% gam- 
ling
37% 3-20% agriculture;
35% banks/insur­
ance; 60% gam­
bling
Excessive labor 
costs;1 environ­
mental protection
Advertising; busi­
ness trips and 
meetings
Advertising; travel 
expenses; R&D; 
training expenses
Entertainment ex­ 5(0) Certain energy pro­ None
penses; director’s ducers exempt
remuneration for 6 years; spe­
cial deductions 
for farmers
Fines and penalties 5(0) Reinvested profit al­
lowance; small 
business re­
duced rate; 3/1-
5-year tax reduction 
equal to share of 
foreign partici­
pation (FP) if FP
year exemption > 10%
for new enter­ £
prises" C/i■<
Interest on overdue 5(0) New employee al­ None
1accounts lowance; Invest­ 01
2ment deductions0
Lump-sum em­ 5 (0) for joint 2-year rural small 30% basic rate for H
ployee pay­ ventures enterprise ex­ joint ventures; 2-
ments; Long-term emption; ag­ year exemption </>
loan interest ricultural reduced for most enter­ 1
rate prises z
Expenses not specif­ None 1-year exemption Exempt from taxes S’
ically allowed in and 50% rate re­ until recoup ini­ z
the law duction for cer­ tial investment ~
tain producers’1 B
Expenses not specif­ 5 years only Accelerated depreci­ Offshore compa­
ically allowed in for first ation on active nies located in
the law 3 years 
of costs
production assets Ukraine tax-ex­
empt
Interest on overdue None Reinvested profits; 2-5 year exemp­
and deferred reduced rate or tion, depending
loans 2-year tax exemp- 
tionq
on sector
vO(continued) jg  
v£>
Table 1 Footnotes
'Interest expenses are not deductible if the interest rate exceeds rates approved by the Central Bank of Albania.
bAlbania provides tax incentives for enterprises engaged in production (excluding oil and gas) for more than 10 years, starting 4 years after initial production. This is a 60% tax 
credit for all taxes paid on profits reinvested in the production sector. Reductions are also available for small business.
'Joint ventures with foreign participation of greater than 30% qualify for this incentive.
^Typically, profit resulting from increased production of all or some goods may be exempt or taxed at a lower rate.
'Joint ventures with foreign participation of greater than 50% minimum investment of 5100,000 qualify for this incentive.
'Capital expenditures up to the amount of annual profits are deductible if purchased assets are used for at least 1 year after costs have been deducted.
‘Joint ventures with foreign participation (FP) greater than 20% minimum investment of $100,000, and domestic investment greater than 20% qualify for this incentive. 
hJoint ventures with FP greater than 20% minimum investment of $100,000 and domestic investment less than 20% qualify for this incentive.
In most cases, excessive labor costs are defined as labor costs exceeding the normative wage fund, which is equal to the product of the size of the labor force and a multiple of 
the minimum wage.
'Small enterprises pay 70% of the basic rate in the first 2 years and 50% of the basic rate in the third year after start-up.
'‘Two-year exemption, followed by 25% of basic rate in the third year, and 50% of basic rate in the fourth year, if greater than 70% of turnover is related to production or processing 
of agricultural, consumer, construction materials, or engaged in construction activities.
'To qualify, more than 50% of total credits/policies must be within the agricultural sector.
“Joint ventures with more than 30% foreign participation and minimum investment of $10 million qualify for this incentive.
“Enterprise are granted an allowance for profits reinvested in fixed assets. Most enterprises qualify for the 3-year exemption; bank and insurance companies qualify for the 1-year 
exemption.
“20% of investments in fixed tangible assets and intangible long-term assets are deductible; 30% of gross wages of newly employed persons and trainees are deductible for 12 
months.
'“Rate reduction applies to enterprises engaged in agricultural production, production of consumer goods, and construction enterprises.
’Companies not engaged in distribution, retail, wholesale, or intermediary activities are taxed at 25% of basic rate in the first year, 50% of basic rate in the second year. Exemption 
of two years applies to farms, consumers, and construction enterprises. 30% of profits reinvested or used to repay productive investments in foodstuffs, construction materials, 
and consumer goods are deductible.
Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (1996).
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losses. This latter measure is probably justified at the current stage of development of tax 
administration in CITs. Carry-back provisions are difficult to implement because they require 
reopening returns for prior years.
The vast majority of the CIT enterprise profit taxes do not allow for explicit partial or 
comprehensive (J  la Chile or Israel) adjustments for inflation.45 Croatia allows for a partial 
adjustment for inflation by granting enterprises a “protective interest deduction” equal to the 
enterprise's equity capital times the sum of inflation rate in the manufacturing sector and a 3 
percent real rate of return.46
Because inflation rates have moderated considerably in the past one or two years in most 
CITs, the distortions associated with inflation in such areas as the depreciation of assets (at 
historical costs) or the deduction of full interest costs have decreased in importance. Many CITs 
have dealt with the problem associated with inflation in ways similar to those often used in 
western countries. These include allowing a one-time discretionary revaluation of assets, allow­
ing first in-first out (FIFO) methods for the valuation of inventories,47 and in fewer cases, 
introducing some form of accelerated depreciation. The most common methods of depreciation 
allowed in CITs are straight-line and declining balance methods at historic costs.48 The relative 
merits of different approaches to the measurement of income from capital in CITs are discussed 
in McLure (1991c).
3 .  Tax Incentives and Holidays
This is an area riddled with problems. Most of the enterprise profit taxes in CITs remain saddled 
with special treatments and provisions.49 These measures have contributed to lower collections, 
directly and indirectly, by facilitating evasion and avoidance behavior, have produced an 
increasing perception of unfairness of the tax system, and have added to the distortions in the 
allocation of resources in CIT economies. Perhaps because CITs have not yet shared the failed 
experience of western and developing economies in trying to use the tax system for economic 
and social engineering50 they were bound to repeat some of the same mistakes. A legacy of 
intervention in the economic system for social and political reasons in these countries has 
contributed to this interventionist phase, but in fact the worst may be over. During the past 
years in several CITs there has been a significant reduction in the scope and level of tax 
incentives granted through the enterprise profit tax.51
Tax incentives and holidays are provided by just about every CIT to both domestic and 
foreign enterprises. The latter usually have additional, more generous, provisions. The wide 
range of incentives granted to all enterprises includes reinvestment allowances as a share of 
profits (at times up to 100 percent),52 investments in particular sectors (most often agricultural 
production, but also construction and mineral extraction), and investments in particular areas 
(e.g., those with high unemployment, “free trade zones,” and mountainous or isolated areas). 
Often these incentives are granted at the discretion of the tax and economic authorities. Oiher 
incentives are available for small firms, for increases in production, for first owners of capital, 
for hiring new employees, for privatized firms, and for exporters. In addition to those incentives 
legislated in the tax laws, some CITs have followed in the worst tradition of many developing 
countries of negotiating customized tax incentives or granting tax relief to individual enterprises 
by special decree.54
Since early in the transition, many CITs have provided specific incentives restricted to 
foreign investors, but here also there has been a significant retrenchment from the more generous 
early practices. In fact, several CITs have eliminated all special incentives exclusively designed 
for foreign investors.55 In those CITs in which special provisions remain, to qualify for tax 
incentives foreign investors are typically required to have a participation of at least 30 percent 
in the business and often a minimum absolute dollar amount of investment. The tax incentive 
typically exempts profits or taxes them at a reduced rate for a period of two to five years. 
For example, in the Russian Federation, foreign investors engaged in production activities with 
a business participation rate above 30 percent and with a minimum investment of $10 million
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qualify for a two-year exemption from the enterprise income tax and for a tax rate reduction 
of 75 percent in the third year and 50 percent in the fourth year (Table 1).
4 . Treatm ent of Foreign Incom e
Special tax incentives have been justified by the need of CITs to attract foreign investment.57 
Tax incentives are just part of the more general issue for CITs of how to tax income made by 
foreigners.58 This question requires taking into account the (investor’s) home country tax treat­
ment of incomes generated abroad and perhaps also the treatment of other countries in transition 
that are potential competitors for foreign investment.59 This complex issue still waits to be 
addressed in a well-balanced manner in CITs.
Most CITs treat foreign companies as domestic legal entities when they have been regis­
tered or incorporated in the country. Also, most of the CITs levy a withholding tax on royalties, 
dividends, and interest paid to nonresident enterprises at moderate rates, ranging from 10 to 
25 percent.60
D. Excess Wage Taxes
Excess wage taxes of various forms have been common levies peculiar to CITs.61 These countries 
introduced excess wage taxation for a variety of reasons. First, there was a perception that 
state enterprise managers would use reconversion and privatization as a means to decapitalize 
the firm. The fear was that enterprise managers under pressure from labor would divert capital 
to the wage fund. With relaxed or no price constraints enforced by national planning, enterprise 
managers can buy industrial peace and perhaps personal gain by awarding excessive wage 
payments at the expense of capital (Tait and Erbas, 1995). Second, in the absence of profit- 
seeking behavior in private firms, there was no effective constraint on wage demands by 
labor. The EWT was designed to penalize “excessive” wage increases and prevent inflationary 
pressures. Finally, the growth in income disparity was deemed to be an undesired result of the 
transition process, and by limiting wage growth governments felt that they could limit the 
increasing disparity.
However, EWTs have been poor solutions to the more central problems of eliminating 
labor management and imposing stricter budget constraints on enterprises (McLure, 1991a). In 
addition, EWTs can discourage innovation and productivity growth by preventing firms from 
raising wages to attract and retain well-skilled, motivated workers or by penalizing those firms 
that have a more productive and better trained workforce (Shome and Escolano, 1993; Jackman, 
1994).
The EWTs take different forms. In some cases, all wages (Uzbekistan) or part of the 
wages (Azerbijan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) are not allowed 
as deductions and therefore are included in the base of the enterprise profits tax. Other countries, 
such as Poland, had a separate levy on excess wages. Although the trend has been for the 
elimination of EWTs, there has been hesitation. Kazakstan introduced a new EWT in 1996 
shortly after the old EWT had been eliminated, however, this new EWT was never implemented 
and has now been repealed.62
An EWT can generate significant revenues by widening the base of the standard enterprise 
profits tax.63 Although sizeable EWT revenues have been collected in some CITs, on average 
revenues have been limited, in part due to the increase in budget arrears. Tait and Erbas (1995) 
argue that a relatively small increase in the standard enterprise profits tax would generate 
sufficient revenue to more than match the revenue potential of most EWTs. In practice, EWTs 
are limited but did not stop state enterprise managers from granting exorbitant or inflationary 
wage increases. The endurance of EWTs is apparent because they can generate some revenue, 
and more important, because they are relatively easy to administer in the state enterprise sector. 
Countries that still continue to use an EWT have been generally less advanced in the privatization 
of the state enterprise sector, however, the effective administration of the EWT may be less 
dependent on the degree of privatization than on the average size of enterprises.
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E. Personal Income Tax
The pioneer in the reform of individual income taxes was also Hungary, which introduced a 
broad-based individual income tax in 1988. This lead was followed by Poland, which introduced 
a global income tax in substitution for the previous schedular taxes in 1992. Most former soviet 
union (FSU) countries just continued using the taxes inherited from the Soviet Union. The big 
avalanche of reform of individual income taxes in other CITs came in 1993 and 1994. Most 
CITs have continued to reform and fine tune their individual income taxes up to the present 
time, however.
In designing new individual income taxes, CITs have had several important decisions to 
make (McLure, 1991a). Among the two most important decisions were the choice of tax base, 
income or consumption, and the overall structure of the tax, global (lumping all sources of 
income in one single base) or schedular (allowing for different bases and perhaps rates, 
depending on the source of income). Other important decisions included the partial or full 
integration of enterprise and individual income taxes, rate structure, inflation adjustment of 
monetary figures (exemptions and rate structure), use of indexation for inflation for the measure­
ment of income, and the use of personal and family exemptions and itemized deductions to 
arrive at a taxable base.
1. Structure
As in the case o f most income taxes in western and developing countries, CITs have adopted 
neither a full income tax base nor a consumption base, but rather a hybrid base with features 
from both approaches (McLure and Zodrow, 1996a; McLure, 1992a). To the extent that a 
consumption-based income tax provides more incentives to savings and investment, the choice 
of a consumption base would be more desirable in CITs because of their much higher needs 
for national savings and capital accumulation.61 Four CITs (Croatia, Albania, Latvia, and Lithuania) 
have adopted close to a consumption-based income tax by exempting dividends and all interest 
income (Table 2).M This treatment is the equivalent of a consumption tax with nonregistered 
accounts, however, none of these four countries has adopted the complement of an enterprise 
cash-flow tax.66 As discussed below, many other CITs tax different forms of capital income 
more lightly than labor income.
The aim of most CITs has been to adopt a global personal income tax similar to that 
existing in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, in 
which tax is paid on global income with credit for taxes withheld at the source and estimated 
tax payments. As is the case in developing countries, however, the lack of a well-developed 
tax administration in CITs clearly calls for a more significant role for withholding taxes and for 
the preservation of a schedular structure of income taxes to reduce the number of returns 
processed by the tax administration.67 There will be at least a temporary trade-off between what 
is administratively feasible and other desirable goals of tax policy. A schedular structure typically 
sacrifices horizontal and vertical equity and introduces economic distortions by treating income 
from different sources differently. On the other hand, it is much easier to administer and enforce 
effectively.
Almost without exception CITs eliminated all previous schedular taxes on labor or employ­
ment income, and all of these incomes are now taxed in a single base, however, many of these 
countries also use schedular final withholding taxes for salaried employees who have no other 
sources of income and whose salaries are subject to withholding. Also common are schedular 
final withholding taxes for several forms of capital income, when these are not exempt/*
2 .  Tax B ase
The base of the individual income tax in CITs includes all types of labor and employment 
income. CITs with global individual income taxes also include income from capital and other 
sources that are not exempt (Table 2),69 but as mentioned above, many other CITs use schedular 
final withholding taxes for some forms of capital income.
Table 2 Personal Income Tax and Social Security Contributions
Country
Highest Excepted income
rate (%) (minimum ownership period)
Albania
Armenia
Azerbijan
Belarus
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Re­
public
Estonia
Georgia
40
30
40
40
50
35
40
26
20
Capital gains, state pensions 
Capital gains on private prop­
erty, state pensions 
Capital gains on private prop­
erty, all pensions
All gains on private property, al­
imony, state pensions 
All pensions, severance pay­
ments, royalties received 
from abroad 
Immovable property (3 years), 
all interest, dividends, capped 
amount of all pensions 
Primary home (2 years), other 
immovable property (5 
years), share in joint stock 
companies (3 months), other 
movable property, alimony 
Private dwellings (2 years), 
other private property, land 
and building received under 
property reforms, dividends, 
state pensions 
All gains on private property, 
sale of agricultural produce, 
severance and compensation 
payments, all pensions
Taxation of 
dividends
None
Personal income tax
Personal income tax; 
prepayment withheld 
at source
15% final withholding
Personal income tax; 
prepayment withheld 
at source
Exempt
25% final withholding
26%
Personal income tax
Treatment of interest
Employer 
social security 
contribution (%)
Employee 
social security 
contribution (%)
None
Personal income tax
32.5
37
10
1
Personal income tax; in­
terest on savings and 
securities exempt 
Exempt
Exempt
37
36
42-57 
(20% expatriates)
Exempt 19.75 23.85
15% interest on savings; 35 12.5
25% interest on securi­
ties
10% final withholding 33
on bank interest; 26% 
creditable withhold­
ing on nonbank in­
terest
Personal income tax; 37
domestic bank inter­
est exempt
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Hungary 48
Kazakstan 40
Kyrgyzstan 40
Latvia 25 
10
Lithuania 33
Moldovia 50
Poland 45
Romania 60
Russia 35
Serbia 35
Primary home (5 years), all pen­
sions, interest and capital 
gains on certain bonds, ali­
mony
Sale of private residence 
Gains on private properly, rein­
vested dividend income, state 
pensions 
Sale on any personal property, 
dividends, alimony, state pen­
sions
Sale of any personal property, 
dividends, state pensions 
Gains on private property, all 
pensions, inheritance and 
gifts, alimony, all pensions 
Capital gains used for primary 
home purchase; gains on cer­
tain securities, bonds, and in­
terest-bearing securities 
Gains from sale of any personal 
property, all pensions 
All pensions, gains not exceed 
5000 multiple wages for im­
movable personal property, 
1000 multiple wages for all 
other property 
Immovable property (10 years), 
sale of immovable property if 
reinvested in dwelling, most 
gains from movable property, 
all pensions
10% final withholding
15% final withholding 
15% final withholding
Exempt
Exempt
Personal income tax 
20% final withholding
10% final withholding 
Personal income tax
90% taxed at personal 
income tax rates
Exempt 47 11.5
(8.5% expatriate) (1.5% expatriate)
15% final withholding 32
Exempt 37
Exempt 37 1
Exempt 30 1
Personal income tax 39 1
20% final withholding 48.5 0
on loans; interest on 
savings and securities 
exempt
Exempt 20-50 4
Domestic bank interest 38.5 1
exempt
Personal income tax; 23.8 23.8
20% advance with­
holding at source
(continued)
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Tabic 2 Continued
Country
Highest 
rate (%)
Excepted income 
(minimum ownership period)
Taxation of 
dividends Treatment of interest
Employer 
social security 
contribution (%)
Employee 
social security 
contribution (%)
Slovak
Republic
42 Primary home (5 years), other 
immovable property (5 
years), share in certain enti­
ties (5 years), other moveable 
property (7 years)
15% final withholding 15% final withholding 
on savings interest
38 12
Slovenia 50 Real estate (3 years); gains on 
securities until 1/1/97
60% taxed at personal 
income tax rate; pre­
payment withheld at 
source
Personal income tax; 
prepayment withheld 
at source
19.37 22.1
Tajikistan 40 Gains on capital assets, state 
pensions
Personal income tax; 
prepayment withheld 
at source
Personal income tax; do­
mestic bank interest 
exempt; prepayment 
withheld at source
38 0
Turkmenistan 8 Interest from domestic banks, 
state pensions
15% final withholding 15% final withholding; 
domestic bank inter­
est exempt
30 1
Ukraine 40 Gains from sale of personal 
property, premium bonds, ali­
mony, state and voluntary in­
surance pensions
15% prepayment with­
held at the source
Exempt 39 1
Uzbekistan 40 Gains from sale of personal 
property; interest from domes­
tic banks, premium bonds, 
state securities, alimony, state 
pensions
Personal income tax; 
prepayment withheld 
at source
Personal income tax; do­
mestic bank interest 
exempt; prepayment 
withheld at source
40 3
Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (1996).
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The definition of employment income is wide.70 An almost universal feature of CITs is 
the attempt to widen the individual income tax base to include fringe benefits, bonuses, 
allowances, and other forms noncash income. These forms of compensation appear to be more 
common in transition economies than in market economies,’1 however, it is unclear how 
effective the taxation of fringe benefits has been. These forms of compensation are notoriously 
hard to tax even in countries with the most advanced tax administration systems. One way to 
ensure wider taxation of fringe benefits is to tax them at the company level. So far, only Hungary 
has used this approach among CITs.72 Still, a simpler administrative approach to this issue is 
to disallow companies a deduction for those fringe benefits not taxed at the individual level.'’
Practically all CITs exempt income from pensions.74 As discussed elsewhere in this section, 
many CITs also exempt interest income, and fewer of them exempt dividends and capital gains 
from the sale of private property. Other incomes commonly exempted from income tax include 
scholarships, compensation for damages, and welfare payments. Most CITs allow personal and 
dependent deductions in the individual income ta x .s
3 .  Tax Rates
Most CITs have a progressive tax rate schedule, however, there is a wide variety of rate structures, 
ranging from fifteen brackets for Romania and eight brackets in Bulgaria to a single rate in 
Estonia and two brackets in Croatia and Latvia (Table 2).76 The choice of rate structure overall 
seems to strike a balance between the goals of revenue raising and redistribution with those 
of encouraging work effort or savings and entrepreneurial activity. The normal top marginal 
rate in CITs is 40 percent.77 Several countries have higher rates: Romania heads the list with a 
top rate of 60 percent, followed by Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Moldova, all with a top rate of 50 
percent, Hungary with 48 percent, and Poland with 45 percent.7* Russia’s top marginal rate is 
35 percent and Kazakstan’s is 40 percent. Overall, these tax rate structures are not that different 
from the tax rates currently in force in OECD countries (Table 2).79 The need to maintain a 
close relation between the top individual rate and the company rate is not respected in many 
CITs (Tables 1 and 2).
None of the CIT countries has explicit adjustments for inflation in the individual income 
tax, however, about one-third define tax brackets in terms of minimum salaries or personal 
allowances. Minimum salaries do not necessarily respond to inflation in an automatic form, 
because they tend to be legislated periodically. Increases in minimum salaries are sometimes 
not granted because of their implications for macroeconomic and income policies, nevertheless, 
their use is likely to be quite effective in slowing down the “bracket creep" that accompanies 
individual income taxes in inflationary times.80
Revenue considerations have weighed heavily on the decision of whether or not to index 
individual income taxes for inflation. When Poland introduced the new individual income tax 
in 1992, it provided for the indexing of the three tax brackets for inflation. The government 
decided against the implementation of this measure in 1993, however, because of the need to 
raise revenues to close the budget deficit (Kodrzycki, 1993). The Russian Federation first defined 
the tax brackets in the individual income tax in terms of the minimum wage but later switched 
to nominal income amounts to define the brackets.
4 . T he Integration of Enterprise and Individual Incom e T axes
The existence of two separate taxes on individual and company income can lead to double 
taxation of enterprise income and to the different tax treatment of distributed and retained 
profits of enterprises. This is a complex issue that has received significantly different solutions 
in Western countries.81 The approach to this issue also differs in the CITs. Some CITs have 
adopted a “classical system” which subjects dividends to both company and individual income 
tax at regular rates.82 A more common approach is partial integration by providing relief through 
lower and flat rates for taxing dividends83 or partially exempting dividends from personal rates.84 
Only four countries entirely exempt dividends at the personal level (Croatia, Albania, Latvia,
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and Lithuania), and one, Estonia, provides relief at the company level by granting a deduction 
for the individual tax withheld.
F. Payroll and Social Security Taxes
Payroll taxes or social security contributions are invariably high in CITs even when compared 
to those prevalent in OECD countries (Tanzi, 1994). This is despite recent reforms that have 
strived to reduce contribution rates. These changes are likely to continue as CITs proceed with 
deeper reforms in their pension, disability, health insurance, and unemployment compensation 
systems. Although it is generally not possible simply to add rates paid by employees and 
employers, the outlier in terms of high rates is Hungary, with a combined employee/employer 
contribution of 58.5 percent. As of 1996, eight CITs have combined employer/employee contri­
butions between 40 and 50 percent.85 The lowest combined rates are just above 30 percent 
(Table 2).8,1 Note, however, that to find full disincentive effects it would be necessary to add 
income tax rates.
Although payroll taxes may be more or less linked with benefits to employees, there is 
rightly a widespread concern among CITs that they may introduce an important antilabor bias 
in the choice of production technologies and damage international competitiveness. The high 
burden on labor employment represented by payroll taxes in combination with the personal 
income tax withheld on wages also creates significant incentives to shift jobs to the underground 
economy McLure, Martinez-Vazquez, and Wallace (1997). A more optimistic view of this issue 
is that the interaction between the benefits of old-age pensions, health, and unemployment 
insurance on the one hand, and the individual income tax on the other, could help secure 
greater compliance with the latter (Hussian and Stern, 1993). The link between benefits and 
better compliance with payroll taxes and ultimately income taxes, however, is often weak or 
broken because eligibility and benefit levels are only loosely linked to individual contributions. 
Often, as we see below, there are no employee contributions at all.
The general view of payroll and social security taxes differ among western countries. 
Some of these countries lump revenues from these levies with other types of taxes and they 
are taken as one of several general sources of funding for social welfare expenditures. Other 
western countries view payroll and social security levies as specific contributions earmarked 
to well-defined welfare programs. Most CITs appear to have adopted this latter model, but 
with modifications. Without exception, CITs inherited comprehensive old-age pension and 
health insurance systems from the previous regime. In most cases, the previous systems were 
almost entirely financed by employers. At the present time, all FSU countries, including the 
Baltics, still have systems that are 100 percent (or near that) employer-financed. This is also 
currently the situation in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. The CITs spawned from the disintegra­
tion of Yugoslavia inherited a system with mixed employer-employee contributions. Hungary, 
the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic also have mixed contributions systems.
In theory, the economic incidence of payroll taxes is not affected by the division of 
charges between employers and employees, however, the use of explicit employee contributions 
together with employer contributions offers several potential advantages: it is more transparent, 
thus dispelling the misconception that benefits are free goods, and it may get employees more 
interested in the overall management of the funds. A split payment system also offers the 
possibility of tailoring contributions and benefits to individual circumstances.
G. VAT and Other Indirect Taxes
The task for indirect taxation reform was clear from the start of the transition. There was a 
need to replace the complex turnover taxes prevalent in the previous regime, which, as we 
saw, at times had thousands of rates. The basic choice for reform was between a single-stage 
retail sales tax with wide coverage and only a few rates and a conventional invoice-credit VAT. 
To a large extent, a retail sales tax can be more difficult to administer and enforce than a
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credit-invoice-type VAT. The VAT facilitates collection at the early stages of production or at 
importation, allows effective exemption of capital goods and intermediate goods, and provides 
easy adjustment of indirect taxation for cross-border trade.® On the minus side, the VAT can 
present problems in its extension to the retail level, and the crediting process for intermediate 
payments of the tax can be easily abused. Many CITs opted for the adoption of VAT early in 
the transition. In particular, those desiring to enter the EU adopted EU-style VATs, however, 
several CITs used an intermediate strategy of simplifying and refining their existing turnover 
taxes for a number of years in preparation for the introduction of a VAT. Hungary, Russia, and 
the rest of the CIS countries89 went cold turkey from turnover taxes to VAT. All other CITs had 
a shorter or longer adaptation period. In some cases (e.g., Bulgaria and Croatia) VAT laws 
were approved by the parliament but their implementation was postponed several times.
The current system of indirect taxation in CITs is similar to that in western and most 
developing countries, and it consists o f a VAT or a general sales tax, a system of excises, and 
taxes on international trade.
H. Value-Added Tax (VAT)
By now all CITs except four have introduced a VAT. The four countries yet without a VAT are 
Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, and Albania. The three former Yugoslavian republics rely on general 
sales taxes at the retail level as the main form of indirect taxation. These sales taxes are still 
characterized by multiple rates and some degree of cascading, but they represent significant 
improvements on the old turnover taxes. The introduction of a VAT has been discussed in all 
four of these countries, and Croatia, at least, plans to introduce a VAT in January 1997.
For those CITs that already have a VAT, two basic models were originally followed in 
its adoption, although over the years almost every one of these countries has continued to 
reform its VAT and some convergence has taken place.90 The first is the Russian model, which 
was adopted in all CIS countries. This was a peculiar VAT system with many problems, as we 
discuss below. The second is the European or the EU model, which was adopted with variations 
by the rest of the Central and Eastern Europe CITs. Because of the significant differences 
between the VATs in the two groups o f countries, they are discussed separately below.
I . The VA T in Russia and Other FSU  Countries
Russia introduced a VAT in January 1992 patterned after the VAT approved by the Supreme 
Soviet of the Soviet Union on December 6, 1991, just before the dissolution of the USSR. With 
the exception of the three Baltic countries, all other former Soviet republics also adopted a 
VAT patterned after the Soviet Union VAT. Because of the economic and political weight of 
Russia among CIS countries, they often followed Russian reforms, at least until recently.91
The VAT systems originally adopted in Russia and the rest of the CIS are extensively 
reviewed in Summers and Sunley (1995) and Shome and Escolano (1993). Two positive aspects 
of the “Russian model” VAT were that it had a single rate, albeit high at 28 percent, and it had 
a fairly broad base covering most goods and services.92 However, the Russian model also 
presented many peculiarities and problems, some of which have been addressed over the past 
few years, but others of which still remain. One problem that Russia tried to address in 1996 
is the accounting of tax liabilities for sales on a cash basis. The cash method is fundamentally 
incompatible with the effective application of the invoice-credit system, the cornerstone of 
most modem VAT systems. The revenue consequences of cash accounting for liabilities were 
aggravated (and perhaps encouraged) by the high level of interenterprise arrears existing in 
Russia and the rest of the CIS. The revenue performance of the VAT in these countries also 
suffered, because despite the use of a cash basis for liabilities, credit for the VAT paid for inputs 
was allowed at the time inputs were put into production.
A second problem with the Russian model VAT is that the credit-invoice method was 
only used in most of the CIS for calculating tax liabilities at the manufacturing level. Liabilities
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at the wholesale and retail levels, in most service sectors, and in some countries at the manufactur­
ing level as well, were calculated using a subtraction method VAT on the basis of taxpayers’ 
gross margins.93 This practice is still in effect in some CIS countries. It is also one reason that 
VAT laws in many CIS countries, as we will see below, still do not have a minimum threshold 
level of business for registration as a VAT taxpayer. A third problem with the original Russian 
model VAT was that it denied credits for the VAT paid on capital inputs, which amounted to 
28 percent tax on investment.*4 This practice destroyed the consumption basis of the VAT and 
it introduced cascading elements in the tax, thus penalizing exports, among other things, even 
if they were zero-rated. There were also problems of identifying creditable and noncreditable 
taxes on business. Most o f the countries in the CIS now allow either a delayed credit over a 
period of several months or an instantaneous credit for capital purchases, and have clarified 
crediting rules.
Another important peculiarity of the Russian model VAT is that it applies the origin 
method for trade among CIS countries. Exports within the CIS are treated as domestic sales, 
so they are subject to tax, while imports are exempt from tax. In contrast, most countries with 
a VAT use the destination method for international transactions with third countries.95 Under 
the destination method, exports are zero-rated (exempt and given a credit for the tax on 
purchases), and imports are subject to tax. The application of the origin method can cause 
significant distortions and redistribution of revenues, especially when trade among the countries 
is not balanced and the rates and base of the VAT differ. For example, at the present time 
Katakstan pays a VAT on imported capital goods to Russia and Ukraine, but as Summers and 
Sunley (1995) point out, ultimately the question of which method (origin or destination) to 
apply for the taxation of mutual trade depends on how these countries organize economic 
cooperation among themselves. This difficult issue has not been resolved for trade within the 
EU, either. The adoption of the destination method within the CIS would require the introduction 
of more effective border controls.
Also peculiar to the original Russian model VAT was the fact that imports were not 
covered by tax. This has been reformed. At present, imports from outside the CIS are always 
subject to VAT, but the base still differs.96 The prevalent structure of the VAT in CIS countries 
is reviewed below using the most current information available, but this and all other aspects 
of the tax structure, o f course, are continuously subject to change and revision.
a. Exempted Commodities. From the time of the original adoption of the VAT there 
has been a significant increase in the number of exemptions and special treatments across most 
of the CIS countries. This has led to a significant narrowing of the tax base.97 The activities or 
commodities deemed desirable for exemption vary' by country, but they typically include basic 
foods, medicines and health services, education services, and public transport. Also exempted 
are those difficult-to-tax sectors, including banking and insurance, farming, and housing. Many 
CIS countries also exempt some professional services such as legal and translation services, 
presumably because of the difficulty of enforcing the tax in some areas.98
b. Scope o f the Tax. A hard decision for all CITs upon the introduction of a VAT was 
whether or not to extend the tax to the retail level. As we saw, the CIS countries did extend 
it, but with liabilities calculated on gross margins. A related decision involved the proper 
treatment of small businesses: how to avoid overburdening the system with small taxpayers 
that could not be expected to carry the books of accounts necessary to enforce the tax. The 
original Russian model VAT had no registration limit threshold, and many of the CITs in this 
group, including Russia, still do not have a specified threshold. Kazakhstan, Georgia, and 
Turkmenistan have introduced thresholds that are defined in terms of minimum salaries or their 
equivalents.
c. Tax Rates. All CITs in this group have a single rate for the VAT, except for Russia, 
which applies a lower rate of 10 percent to medicines and basic foods (Table 3). This is an 
especially important positive design feature, given the current weakness of the tax administra­
tions in these countries. Also important, given the application of an origin principle for trade 
within the CIS, is that all these countries but two have the same VAT rate of 20 percent. The
Table 3 Value Added Tax
Country
Rate 
(reduced 
rate; %)
Goods and services taxed 
at reduced rate Exemptions
Definition of importation 
of goods
Taxable base of 
imported goods
Armenia 20% Not applicable
Azerbijan 20% Not applicable
Belarus 20% Not applicable
Bulgaria 18% Not applicable
Czech Re- 22% Basic foodstuffs, oil products,
public (5%) pharmaceuticals, all services
except those specifically 
taxed at 22%
Estonia 18% Not applicable
Residential rents, insurance and bank­
ing services, passenger transport, 
municipal services, most social ser­
vices, legal services, copyrights 
and licenses 
Residential rents, insurance and bank­
ing services, legal services, copy­
rights and licenses, certain food­
stuffs, educational services 
Public transport, postal, health, edu­
cational, financial, and legal ser­
vices, security operations, munici­
pal services 
Financial, insurance, educational, 
health, and gambling services, 
land sales, leasing of land and 
buildings 
Postal, financial, educational, health, 
insurance, social and gambling ser­
vices, radio and tv services, trans­
fer of land and buildings (after 
minimum 2 year holding require­
ment)
Banking and .insurance, residential 
lets, newspapers and periodicals, 
medical equipment and services, 
state postal, educational, and fu­
neral services, gambling and lot­
tery tickets
Importation of goods 
from outside CIS is 
subject to VAT
Importation of goods 
from outside CIS is 
subject to VAT
Importation of goods 
from outside CIS is 
subject to VAT
Goods passing customs 
frontier into rest of 
country
Goods cleared for free 
circulation in country
Importation of goods 
from abroad
Customs value
Customs value
Customs value plus cus­
toms duties, excise du­
ties, and import fees
Customs value plus cus­
toms duties and fees 
and excise duties
Customs value plus cus­
toms duty
(Continued)
Table 3 Continued
Country
Rate 
(reduced 
rate; %)
Goods and services taxed 
at reduced rate Exemptions
Georgia
Hungary
10% Not applicable
25% Household energy, medial in- 
(12%) struments, basic foodstuffs, 
agricultural, transportation
Residential lets, public transport, cer­
tain basic foodstuffs, financial, 
medical and educational services 
Financial (excluding leasing), health, 
educational, postal, radio, televi­
sion, and gambling services
Kazakstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
Moldova
20% Not applicable
20 Not applicable
18 Not applicable
18% Certain food products 
(9% until 
1/1/97)
20 Not applicable
Financial, postal, scientific, and edu­
cational services, lease of land 
and buildings under certain condi­
tions
Financial and banking services, 
postal, educational, and cultural 
services, public transport and utilit­
ies, some copyrights and patents 
Financial service, medicine and 
health services, entertainment, resi­
dential accommodations 
Basic foodstuffs, insurance and bank­
ing services, medicines and medi­
cal equipment, newspapers, 
books, and postal services 
No information
Definition of importation Taxable base of 
of goods imported goods
Importation of goods 
from outside CIS is 
subject to VAT 
Importation of a prod­
uct in any manner
Importation of goods 
from outside CIS is 
subject to VAT
Importation of goods 
from outside CIS is 
subject to VAT
Importation of goods 
from abroad
Importation of goods 
from abroad
Customs value
Customs value plus cus­
toms duties and fees 
plus additional costs 
incurred before prod­
uct reaches first do­
mestic destination 
Customs value or value 
equal to import lev­
ies, duties and taxes 
multiplied by 1.2
No provision
Customs value plus cus­
toms duty
No information No information
Poland 22 Agricultural machinery, medical Agricultural, financial, educational, Entry of goods from Customs value plus
(12, 7) instruments, unexempted food­
stuffs, hotel services, building 
materials, passenger transport, 
medical services; 12% rate ap­
plies to fuels and energy
cultural, postal, and public admin­
istration services, milk and dairy 
products, poultry and fish
abroad to customs ir­
respective of manner 
of entry
customs duties, excise 
duties, and import tax
of 3%
Romania 18 (9) Basic foodstuffs and medicine Financial services, leasing of land 
and buildings, health, educational, 
cultural, and sporting services
Entry of goods from 
abroad
Customs value plus 
customs duties and 
excises
Russia 20 (10) Basic foodstuffs and pharmaceu­
ticals
Residential lets, banking and insur­
ance, capital contributions, gam­
bling, sale of assets during privati­
zation, financial, educational, 
postal, cultural, and sports services
Importation of goods 
from outside CIS is 
subject to VAT
Customs value plus 
import duties and 
excises
Slovak Re­ 23 (6) Basic foodstuffs, oil products, Financial, educational postal, cultural, Goods cleared for free Customs value plus cus­
public pharmaceuticals, paper prod­
ucts, all services except those 
taxed at 23%
iasurance, social, gambling, radio, 
and television services, transfer 
and lease of land and new build­
ing (2 years after acquisition)
circulation in country toms duties, excise 
taxes, and import sur­
charge of 10%
Tajikistan 20 (3% 
special tax)
Not applicable Sale of assets during privatization, fi­
nancial, educational, postal, cul­
tural, translation, postal, and legal 
services
Importation of goods 
from outside CIS is 
subject to VAT
Customs value plus im­
port duties and ex­
cises
Turkmenistan 20 Not applicable Foodstuffs and children’s goods, 
banking and postal services, 
health care, pharmaceuticals, fur, 
hides, raw cotton, and construc­
tion materials
Importation of goods 
from outside CIS is 
subject to VAT
Ukraine 20 Not applicable Transportation, financial, insurance, 
postal, interpretation, cultural, and 
educational services, public utilities, 
pharmaceuticals, medical services
Importation of goods 
from outside CIS is 
subject to VAT
Customs value plus cus­
toms duties
Uzbekistan 17 Not applicable Exports, financial, cultural, and educa­
tional services, public transport, pub­
lic utilities, construction materials
Importation of goods 
from outside CIS is 
subject to VAT
Customs value plus cus­
toms duties, excises
Note: Most CIS countries use a subtraction method for traders, use a restricted origin principle, and restrict for disallow credit for capital goods. 
Source-. International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (1996).
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exceptions at the present time are Georgia, with a rate of 10 percent, and Uzbekistan, with a 
rate of 17 percent.
2 . T h e  VA T in O ther CITs
Hungary was again the front-runner in the reform of indirect taxation by replacing its turnover 
tax with a VAT in 1988. The desire to join the EU weighs heavily in this decision. Next in line 
were Poland and Romania, which introduced a VAT in the summer of 1993.
a. Exempted Commodities. Because many of these countries have a lower VAT tax 
rate for certain commodities, such as food and medicines, the list of full exemptions is generally 
smaller. Typically, health and educational services are exempt, as are hard-to-tax activities such 
as banking and insurance. The trend has been toward expanding the tax base by reducing 
exemptions, especially for services. Exports in this group of CITs are zero-rated, so that they 
are not only exempt, but there is a credit for VAT paid in the intermediate steps of production. 
In the early stages o f the reforms, several countries made more liberal use of zero-rating. For 
example, in the reform of 1988 Hungary applied a zero rate to food and many other basic 
goods, representing up to 40 percent of the tax base. Later reforms eliminated the zero rate 
status for all goods with the exception of exports and medicines.
b. Scope o f the Tax. All CITs in this group have extended the coverage of the VAT 
to the retail level using the invoice method, however, small businesses are exempted from 
registering for the VAT. Unlike CITs in the CIS group, all CITs in this group have a well-defined 
limit (an absolute money amount) for the threshold or minimum level of business activity under 
which businesses are not required to register under the VAT.
c. Tax Rates. Most of the countries in this group have adopted two rates for the VAT 
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Lithuania) or a single rate (Bulgaria, 
Estonia, and Latvia). The exception is Poland, which has three rates. The lower rates are used 
for commodities such as food, medicines, or transportation, which in other countries may be 
exempt." Several countries in this group have experienced rate changes. For example, Romania 
started with a single rate and later switched to two rates, and Estonia and Latvia started with 
relatively low rates and later increased them.
The top tax rates for the VAT in this group of CITs tend to be higher than those in Western 
VATs. This has been explained as due to the fact that tax bases in CITs tend to be narrower 
both statutorily and economically and perhaps also by CITs’ high revenue requirements. Hungary 
levies the highest rate at 25 percent, followed by the Slovak Republic at 23 percent, and Poland 
and the Czech Republic, both at 22 percent. All other CITs in this group have a top rate of 18 
percent (Table 2).
3 . O ther Indirect T axes
Other forms of indirect taxes in CITs, such as excise taxes and taxes on international trade, 
have received much less attention in the literature, perhaps signifying their smaller importance 
in overall revenues.100
a. Excise Taxes. Hungary was the first CIT to adopt western-type separate excise taxes. 
These were adopted with the new VAT in 1988. Most CITs also introduced separate excise 
taxes when they introduced their VATs or earlier in the transition when the old turnover taxes 
were simplified in preparation for the adoption of a VAT. With few exceptions, CITs levy 
excises on the traditional commodities: tobacco products, alcoholic beverages, and petroleum 
products. In some CITs the list of excisable commodities is augmented by several “luxury 
goods.” This category, not surprisingly, varies across countries. There is also a variety of rates. 
Specific rates are used in some CITs for petroleum, alcoholic beverages, and tobacco products, 
but ad valorem rates are much more common.
In the CIS countries that adopted the Russian model VAT, excise goods imported from 
other CIS are exempt from domestic taxes. This is in harmony with the origin method used for 
the VAT for transactions within the CIS, however, imports of excise goods from non-CIS countries
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are subject to excise taxes. Because excise rates can differ significantly within the CIS, it appears 
there has been a considerable increase in trade within the CIS to arbitrage these differences. 
Contraband coming through some of these countries also appears to be on the rise.
b. Customs Duties. As we have seen, taxes falling on imports were not an important 
part of the revenue systems of planned socialist economies. For example, imports in the Soviet 
Union were not subject to the 5 percent multistage sales tax (known as the Gorbachev tax) 
covering many goods and services, but rather were taxed separately. The separate import levy 
fell exclusively on consumption goods and primarily attempted to tax the windfall profits from 
conversion to rubles at the official exchange rate. Some CITs did not tax imports in any way 
in the earlier years of the transition. At the present time, all CITs have adopted a customs duties.
While some Central and Eastern Europe CITs have acted wisely by introducing modestly 
protective tariffs with low rate dispersion, the norm among CITs that are part of the CIS has 
been to put into place high tariff rates with wide dispersion, thus succumbing to pressures for 
the protection of domestic activities and for using import levies as a significant source of tax 
revenue. In particular, the taxation of consumer goods and the exemption of imported inputs 
are likely to lead to high and variable rates of effective protection across economic sectors. 
Collapsing employment and economic activity in many sectors, the lack of quality of domestic 
products, and the availability of cheaper better-quality imports have added to protectionist 
pressures in many CITs. Some of these countries, it appears, are embarking upon the protectionist 
and import-substitution policies that until recent years had entrapped Latin American countries.101 
These policies will lead to the misallocation of domestic resources, lend an antiexport bias to 
production activities, and retard economic growth.
I. The Modernization and Reform of Tax Administration
Whether or not the tax reform effort ultimately succeeds in economies in transition depends 
upon the strength or lack thereof of the tax administration system. Governments have adopted 
westem-style tax structures with relative ease, yet have struggled with low rates of revenue 
mobilization and increasing rates of tax evasion. The modernization and structural reform of 
tax administrations in CITs has lagged behind other reforms, including price liberalization and 
privatization. The relative lack of attention paid to tax administration issues early in the transition 
is a legacy from the unimportant role played by the tax administration in CPEs,'02 but without 
comprehensive modernization and reform of their tax administrations, the tax reform effort in 
CITs will continue to face an uncertain future.
1. D ecreased Revenue Mobilization and the Econom y
Tax revenues in Central and Eastern Europe CITs plunged in the years immediately following 
the early reforms.103 The Baltic countries, Russia, and the rest of the CIS also experienced a 
significant deterioration of tax revenues in real terms and for most of them also as a percentage 
of GDP since 1991 (Citrin and Lahiri, 1995; Hemming, Cheasty, and Lahiri, 1995). This decline 
in revenues is due in large part to economic factors, not the least of which is the collapse of 
economic activity in the traditional sectors o f the economy.104
Specific economic features of transition economies may have also contributed to the poor 
revenue performance. High rates of inflation could have contributed to revenue erosion. Most 
CITs have been subject to spurts of high rates of inflation, especially in the earlier years of the 
transition. Other economies around the world experiencing high inflation have seen an erosion 
of real tax revenues because of the lag between the time when income is generated or the 
economic transaction takes place and the time when taxes are actually paid (a phenomenon 
known as the Tanzi effect). In many CITs, however, collection lags have been relatively short 
by international standards.105 The general lack of indexation of tax structure probably had a 
mixed impact on revenue performance. The depreciation of capital at historical costs and in 
some cases bracket creep in the individual income tax helped increase tax revenues. Other
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features of the tax structure, such as the use of historical costs for the calculation of the VAT 
at the retail level in CIS countries or the exemption of interest income and full deduction of 
interest costs led to losses in revenues. The different composition of tax bases in CITs may 
also have had an impact on revenue performance. For example, the exemption from VAT of 
basic commodities such as food, medicines, transportation, or housing consumption in CITs 
likely represents larger foregone revenues than is the case in western economies because of 
the differences in household budget composition in the two groups of countries.
2 . Impact of Policy on T ax Administration
A commonly aired criticism of tax policy in CITs has been its rapid change and instability 
(McLure, Martinez-Vazquez, and Wallace, 1997; Khankevich, 1996; Bahl and Wallich, 1995; 
Bogetic and Hillman, 1994). The scope and frequency of changes to the tax system cannot be 
accurately measured by changes to the tax code. Frequendy presidential decrees, administrative 
orders, and instructions are used to modify the tax code. The continuous process of change 
reduces the transparency of the tax system, inhibits the ability of tax administrators to correctly 
ascertain individual tax liabilities, and tends to overwhelm honest taxpayers.107 Rapid policy 
changes lead to either perceived or real opportunities for tax evasion and avoidance, and 
therefore to an increased perception of unfairness in the tax system. Taxpayers, faced with a 
rapidly evolving tax code, often unilaterally decide liability issues in their favor. Tax administra­
tors must decide between what is an incorrectly calculated tax liability due to the vagueness 
in the tax code and what is a genuine attempt to evade some part of an individual taxpayer’s 
liability.108 Instability of the tax structure can also discourage investment, especially by foreign 
companies (Riordan and McLure, 1993).
A troubling factor from the policy side is that substantial tax changes have been systemati­
cally introduced with little or no preparation and education of tax administrators and taxpayers. 
Commonly, tax policy reform in CITs has been divorced from the necessary complementary 
legislation reform on the tax administration side."” The most important example is provided 
by the VAT, which was introduced in most CITs with no adequate preparation110 and led to 
unexpected decreases in revenues.111
Tax administration has been made more complex and the revenue streams to the state 
treasuries reduced by CIT government and ministries’ continued issuance of ad hoc exemptions 
and tax holidays.112 As we discussed in our review of enterprise profit taxes, the consequences 
of these policies go beyond administration and collections. The issuance of exemptions, tax 
holidays, and ad hoc adjustments are based upon the perception that certain sectors, such as 
agriculture or energy, are more “important" or that government bureaucrats can improve on 
the resource allocation by markets, but a more likely outcome is that these policies result in a 
misallocation of resources in the economy, leading to lower potential GDP, increased horizontal 
inequities, tax evasion, and reduced incentives for market reform.
A different type of policy in CITs impinging on the effectiveness of tax administration is 
the emerging use o f “tax offsets.” Using tax offsets, government agencies pay for their purchases 
with tax exemptions, which enterprises may then submit in lieu of cash in the settlement of 
the tax bill. In Russia during early 1996 a sharp increase in the fiscal deficit occurred as over 
50 percent o f enterprises used tax offsets to settle the tax accounts in June and July (Ministry 
of Finance of the Russian Federation, 1996). A variant of this system has been used in Kazakhstan, 
in which the government established a clearinghouse of tax and payment arrears. Enterprises 
that were owed money by the government could “swap” these liabilities for tax liabilities, 
effectively settling the existing arrears.
Other aspects of institutional reform have an impact on the effectiveness of tax administra­
tion. An important handicap for effective tax administration in CITs has been the incompatibility 
of old accounting systems with the western-type taxes these countries have adopted. A conspicu­
ous example of this incompatibility has been the use of cash accounting and the invoice method 
for the VAT in Russia and other CIS countries."1 Over the years, many CITs have started adopting
Ta x  Sy st em s  in T r a n s it io n  Ec o n o m ie s 947
new accounting systems (e.g., Kazakhstan in 1995 and Russia in 1996), but their implementation 
will be a long-term effort.
J . Tax Evasion and the Integrity of Tax Administration
No formal studies, to our knowledge, exist on the extent and level of evasion in CITs, however, 
an increasing number of informal estimates seem to confinn that there is a considerable degree 
of tax evasion in these countries. A recent Russian Federation Ministry of Finance report 
estimated that the compliance rates for the VAT and enterprise profit tax fluctuated between 
50 and 60 percent in 1995 and 1996. In Latvia it has been estimated that the informal economy 
outside the tax net represents between 30 and 50 percent of all economic activity.'” The 
existence of widespread tax evasion is also confirmed in a number of taxpayer surveys,11' 
however, it is not uncommon for tax officials to be unaware of or deny the existence of tax 
evasion in their countries (Martinez-Vazquez, 1995; Bird and Tsiopolous, 1994).
Often these estimates of evasion make no distinction between underreporting and nonfil­
ing. Extrapolating from the experience with tax evasion in industrial and developing countries, 
nonfiling should be the more important phenomenon among smaller private businesses. Tax 
administrations in CITs have had to cope with a rapid increase in the number of private 
entities. Khankevich (1996) reports that during 1995 total tax payments of unincorporated 
private entrepreneurs in Belarus increased by 575 percent after the intervention of tax inspectors. 
Underreporting, through underinvoicing, transfer pricing, and the like, should be a more impor­
tant source of evasion among traditional state enterprises and larger new businesses. Khankevich 
(1996) also reports that during 1995 commercial enterprises in Belarus concealed approximately 
one-half of their taxable income and that 93 percent of total tax payments occurred only after 
the intervention of tax inspectors. A practice of manipulating enterprise accounts in Russia 
reported by the OECD (1995a) may be symptomatic of the scale and sophistication of underre­
porting in CITs.116 The opportunity for evasion will be increased with the introduction of tax 
holidays and other special tax treatments.
High taxpayer compliance costs can also be a significant factor in tax evasion. Compliance 
costs are higher if taxpayers have to wait in line for a long time to pay their taxes, forms are 
not available or lack instructions, or if the laws are complex and vague, requiring taxpayers to 
hire expert advice to complete their tax returns. These conditions are descriptive of the present 
conditions in many CITs. Additional filing requirements are also part of compliance costs. For 
example, in Russia and other CIS countries, taxpayers are required to file balance sheets and 
income statements on a quarterly basis, despite the fact that much of this information is hardly 
used by the tax administration.
Corruption and bribery of tax officials, made easier by low wages, is often mentioned 
on an informal basis as a growing cause of increasing evasion in CITs. A milder version of 
questionable practices is moonlighting by tax officials who give tax advice to private taxpayers. 
As the tax code has become more complex in CITs, the need for professional skills and 
specialization in tax laws has increased, and in some countries tax officials have been all too 
happy to fill the vacuum of expertise,” however, some countries have introduced strong 
conflict-of-interest laws to deal with this problem.118
Several other practices of tax administrations in CITs are likely to affect tax evasion. One 
of them is to permanently assign tax inspectors to particular enterprises, thus opening the 
possibility of corruption and other problems. The random assignment of audit cases to tax 
inspectors, as is done in most western countries, is an effective way to reduce opportunities 
for corruption. A second practice has been to earmark a share of tax penalties and additional 
assessments from audits to the tax administration. The “rewards” are typically divided among 
the local and central offices and in some cases a small portion goes as financial incentive to 
the tax inspector. While most tax administrations are in need of additional funds, it is clear that 
this practice is vulnerable to abuse.
Despite these problems and other organizational and procedural shortcomings of transi-
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tion tax administrations (discussed below), it would be all too easy to blame the increases in 
tax evasion in CITs exclusively on weak tax administrations. There are other aspects of the tax 
systems, such as high and cumulative marginal tax rates, ambiguous or poorly drafted tax laws, 
and repeated changes in the laws that are also likely to bear on this issue. Also unrelated to 
the tax administration per se, and much harder to overcome, is the legacy of distrust of the 
state and the lack of a tradition of voluntary compliance in CITs (Kornai, 1990; Tanzi, 1994; 
Bogetic and Hillman, 1994; Summers and Sunley 1995; McLure, 1995b).
K. Tax Administration Organization and Procedures
Technical assistance, principally from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but also from the 
World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the EU, have 
all contributed significantly to the process of modernizing tax administration in many CITs. The 
organization and the operating procedures of many transitional tax administrations, however, 
still remain woefully inadequate to the task at hand. We review some of the remaining problems 
below.
1. Organization Issues
The tax administrations in Russia and the rest of the CIS countries for the most part still have 
the same territorial and organizational structure they inherited from the Soviet Union. Most 
collection and enforcement activities are carried out at the lowest level (territorial inspectorates 
in Russia). The regional offices supervise and coordinate the efforts of the local offices and 
report collections and other information to the central office. In CIS countries, the power and 
control exerted by the central office over the regional offices varies, but are considerably weaker 
than those found in western tax administration systems.119
The organizational structure of the territorial tax offices is by type of taxpayer (e.g., 
individuals and enterprises) or by type of tax (e.g., VAT), which leads to the duplication of 
tasks and to a lack of specialization in the more demanding areas of tax enforcement, such as 
field audits. Western tax administrations have functionally based organizations with specialized 
offices for the major tasks of registration, collection, audit, computerization, and so on. Although 
some eastern European countries have adopted functionally based organizations, the process 
has been slower in CIS countries.120
2 . Registration Issues
The challenge in this area is for transition tax administrations to be able to monitor nonfilers 
and stop-filers. A unique and well-designed taxpayer identification number (TIN) is one key 
for carrying out these tasks properly. Most CITs have such a system or are developing one, 
however, there are problems with the design of the system and in many cases the TINs are 
not unique (Kamite and Dovladbekova, 1995). Although there is concern in many CITs about 
the increasing ranks o f nonfilers in the private sector, few coordinated efforts are being put 
into place to address this problem.
3 .  Collection Issues
Tax arrears represent a constant or increasing problem in many CITs. There are multiple 
causes for these arrears, including the existence of governmental arrears with enterprises. 'I he 
monitoring of collections is in many cases still carried out manually on ledger cards, and many 
CITs lack coordinated plans and procedures to detect and collect arrears. On the other hand, 
several CITs’ tax administrations appear to make effective use of legislation that allows them 
to garnish or seize bank deposits from delinquent taxpayers.
The practice inherited from the past of setting quotas or revenue targets by local office 
may have contributed to a lackluster performance. Once revenue targets are satisfied, there is
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less motivation to vigorously pursue collections of arrears. Revenue forecasting using modem 
techniques is rarely performed. Poor forecasts have also led on some occasions to unrealistic 
collection quotas. Failure to meet these quotas has been at times indiscriminately interpreted 
as flagging tax enforcement. Local tax offices have developed an array of techniques, such as 
pleading with taxpayers to prepay their taxes, to satisfy the official quotas.
4 . Audit Issues
This key area of tax enforcement has been slow to develop. Most CITs have no tradition in 
modem audit techniques. In the past, enterprises were restricted to a single bank account and 
state banks were used to monitor tax compliance. Currently audit work consists of office audits 
using the returns and financial statements submitted by taxpayers. Office or “cameral" audits 
often are perfunctory. Field audits and the use of third-party information remains rare. Audit 
plans and audit selection programs are also rare.
In Russia and other CIS countries the norm inherited from the Soviet Union was to audit 
100 percent of all taxpayers at least every two years. Managers still remain focused on reconciling 
100 percent of tax declarations instead of concentrating on those accounts with the greatest 
revenue potential, but it has become clear that full audits are no longer possible with any 
reasonable level of resources. Neither are they necessary. A self-assessment system for the most 
important taxes combined with well-targeted and publicized audit programs of sample taxpayers 
and presumptive taxation methods for nonfilers, can be much more effective enforcement tools. 
In Russia and other CIS countries penalties are harsh and rules for their application inflexible. 
A penalty of up to 50 percent of the omission is routinely applied to taxpayers who have 
made honest mistakes. In addition, interest rate charges compounded daily make it necessarily 
impossible for many taxpayers to pay their liabilities, driving them down into the underground 
economy.
5 . Taxpayer Services
This area of tax administration, part of the "methodology” section in CIS countries, is extremely 
weak. Taxpayer services were unknown under the previous system and are emerging slowly. 
Taxpayer familiarity with taxes remains low; often taxpayers do not have access to tax regulations 
or even tax forms, and very rarely are these forms accompanied by adequate filing instructions. 
Often, taxpayers have to pay to get instruction booklets and tax forms. On top of everything, 
taxpayer services also have to combat the confusion introduced by rapid changes in the tax 
code and the deep-rooted general distrust of government institutions.
6 . Resource Availability
Practically speaking, all transitional tax administrations must attempt to collect taxes with 
inadequate resources. A prime problem is that tax administrators are unable to retain skilled 
personnel due to the higher wages in the private sector. The high rate of turnover at times has 
worked in fact as a deterrent to aggressive training programs in computerization and accounting.
Although there is little disagreement about the importance of training, most CITs still 
need to develop a structured long-term training program for tax officials in modem tax adminis­
tration and accounting practices.
Until now the lack of financial resources has prevented the creation of information systems 
that facilitate many tasks, such as registration, collections, monitoring, auditing, and billing of 
taxpayers. Some computerization of tax administration services is taking place, but often this 
is not adequately preceded by clearly designed procedures and systems. Often there is a lack 
of coordination of these efforts in different parts of the country, which is likely to lead to 
significant problems of data compatibility and administration in the future.
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L. Future Dilemmas in Tax Administration
The transition to market economies and the reform of other areas of the public sector have 
presented tax administrations in CITs with several additional dilemmas; including the following.
1. Is T here  a Need for Regional and Local G overnm ent T ax Administrations?
Tax administration used to be a local and regional function in most CPEs. Early in the transition, 
most CITs nationalized and centralized their tax services. Former local and regional tax officials 
become employees of the national tax service. The elevation of the tax administration to national 
status did not generally result in a single subordination structure, however. In practice, if not 
de jure, the system of dual subordination, in which tax administrators answered to central 
or federal authorities and to local authorities, remained. In some CIS countries, subnational 
government authorities still have the right to approve key appointments in the territorial offices 
of the state tax administration. The distribution of resources in many cases has not adapted to 
a more centralized tax administration system.121
The importance of dual subordination is highlighted by the reliance of local tax inspecto­
rates on local governments for the provision of housing, medical, and other social services. 
This reliance has given leverage to local governments to pressure tax administrators to ensure 
that local governments are the first to receive revenues, to collect and audit those taxes in 
which local government sharing is most important even if they have a lower revenue potential, 
and to go easy at times on enterprises deemed important by the local authorities.'22 When local 
taxes exist, local authorities can exert pressure to see that these taxes are given priority. A 
different view, and often a complaint of local and regional officials, is that the national tax 
service has much less of an incentive to allocate scarce resources to the collection of local 
taxes.123 Most CITs rightly have opted for the time being to concentrate on the development 
of the national tax administration, but there seems to be some consensus across CITs that in 
the longer run it will be desirable to develop local or regional independent tax administrations 
that would be exclusively in charge of administering subnational taxes.
2 .  T ax Administration and Tax Police
It has been quite common in CITs to introduce an organization parallel to the tax administration 
that is charged with the investigation of tax fraud and other illegal activities such as illicit hard 
currency dealings. In some CITs this organization has been staffed by the former secret police 
as part of an entirely separate organization or attached to the tax administration but with 
separate status and rules and regulations (Bird and Tsiopolous, 1994; Martinez-Vazquez, 1995). 
Although specialized officials concentrating on criminal investigation issues related to tax compli­
ance are badly needed, this problem appears to have been approached in many CITs in a 
heavy-handed way. The concern is that this approach may actually backfire, given the lack of 
trust in government institutions. In addition, the duplication of functions of the tax administration 
and the tax police may be inconsistent, is a waste of resources, and may penalize taxpayers 
unduly.
3 . Should the Tax Administration B e  in Charge of Social Security Contributions?
Many CITs are also struggling with decreasing compliance rates for social security contributions 
or payroll taxes, whose revenues are earmarked to extrabudgetary funds. In many of the CITs 
the typical arrangement is that collection and audit o f payroll taxes are carried out by inspectors 
of the extrabudgetary funds. These inspectors are generally fewer in relative terms and less 
well trained than those of the regular tax administration. The self-enforcement element for 
social security contributions expected from the link between contributions and benefits is in 
many cases weak. Benefits may not be related to contributions or, when they are, the link 
involves only the last years of employment.
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To confront the problem of declining compliance, CITs would need to invest heavily in 
programs to modernize and strengthen the enforcement of social security contributions, but 
given that public resources are very scarce and that similar resource investments are needed 
for the general tax administration, the question is whether or not economies of scale can be 
realized by integrating the collection and enforcement of social security contributions into 
the regular tax administration. Those that answer yes argue that a smaller investment and a 
strengthened collection and enforcement mechanism for both social security contributions and 
taxes are possible. The economies of scale come from the fact that much of the work extrabudget­
ary fund inspectors need to do in collections and audit duplicates the work of the regular tax 
administration for enforcing the withholding tax on wages and salaries.
International practice in western countries in the organization of the enforcement of social 
security contributions is varied. In some countries, the tax administration may be responsible 
for collecting and enforcing social security contributions. In other countries, there may be a 
specialized agency separate from the tax administration for collecting and enforcing all types 
of social security contributions. Still a different model puts each social security agency, such 
as the pension fund and the health fund, in charge of collecting and enforcing its respective 
contributions.
If CITs do decide to integrate collections of social security contributions and all other 
taxes, care is needed to address an incentive problem. Regular tax administration may not 
always have the same incentives to collect contributions as to collect taxes. A solution may be 
to “lease” the services of the tax administration to collect and enforce contributions, making 
sure that the agreement is incentive-compatible on both sides of the bargain.
V. CONCLUSION
The last five to six years of fiscal reform in CITs have provided a formidable economic experiment 
in tax policy design and practice. Given the diversity of countries involved, it is not easy, and 
indeed in some cases it may be misleading, to arrive at general conclusions and lessons from 
this experiment. The paths and strategies for fiscal reform followed by CITs differ considerably, 
as, not surprisingly, do the outcomes. The experiences range from the case of Estonia, for 
example, which adopted a clean modem tax structure in 1993, with wide bases and single 
rates and has barely changed since then, to the case of Belarus, for example, which has not 
changed the substance of the tax system it inherited from the Soviet Union and yet has undertaken 
a myriad of continuous changes in the tax laws. Despite the caveat on the diversity of experi­
ences, several general conclusions emerge from CIT experiences with fiscal reform.
First, it is well known to practitioners that the reform of tax systems never takes place 
on a clean slate. The legacy of the philosophy and practices of tax systems under centralized 
planning has played a significant role in all CITs.
Tax systems in CPEs had markedly different functions from those in market economies. 
Tax systems in CPEs focused on cash management and balancing demand with available supply. 
These tax systems dealt with a relatively small number of state enterprises with a focus on 
heavy industry, and used customized, discriminatory, and at times retroactive measures to 
promote priority areas in the central plan and penalize economic activity that was viewed as 
socially unproductive. There was much less concentration on using tax systems for the more 
conventional purposes such as income distribution or even revenue adequacy, since govern­
ments had the ability to syphon out profits from state enterprises in a variety of ways other 
than taxes and were free to set wages.
Tax administration in CPEs was made easy by the pervasive presence of the state in the 
economy. Tax administrators could use the state banking system to track all sorts of payments 
so that tax enforcement was an issue in applying proper accounting procedures. At the same 
time, tax administrators had extraordinary powers to negotiate tax liabilities and even to adjust
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tax rates retroactively. In sum, CPEs had few reasons to develop tax administrations with many 
of the features that exist in western countries.
The ability to shake off the legacies of the past has varied among CITs. In those countries 
with stronger ties to Western Europe (e.g., the Baltics, the Czech Republic, and Poland), the 
philosophical shift has been accomplished more rapidly than in Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, 
and many of the CIS countries, but at any rate, the lesson is that there can be no good 
understanding of the current problems of tax systems in CITs without deep knowledge of the 
institutional and behavioral legacies inherited from the previous regimes. For example, the 
central authorities in all CITs have created de novo national tax administration systems. The 
traditional attachment of tax administrators to regional and local authorities, however, makes 
many of these national tax administrations very different institutions from the centralized tax 
administrations in western countries. National interests or a national perspective in many CIT 
tax administrations are still secondary to local ones.
Second, tax systems are as good as their enforcement. Effective tax reform cannot be 
accomplished in isolation from the current capabilities of the tax administration systems and 
taxpayers’ culture. In retrospect, the most serious mistake CITs collectively made was to focus 
primarily on modernizing tax policies and relegating tax administration and taxpayer issues to 
a remote second place. Scant attention and fewer resources were dedicated early on in the 
transition to reforming and strengthening tax administration and preparing taxpayers for the 
new taxes and procedures.
This happened despite the almost universal recommendation from the international advi­
sors of giving first priority to the restructuring and modernization of the tax administration 
systems in CITs. There were abundant warnings early on about the substantial investments in 
the time and resources needed to modernize tax administrations. The advice for the most part 
was not heeded. Because the time required for these efforts to take effect was measured in 
years, the focus shifted to tax policy reform, albeit in many cases without considering the legacy 
of the previous system or the limited capacity of the current administration. The results have 
been in many cases lagging collections and increased tax evasion.
Of late, there has been wide explicit recognition in CITs of the need to improve tax 
administration systems, but still there is often no priority given in the allocation of resources 
devoted to this effort. Fundamental problems still remain. Tax administrations in many CITs 
are still not functionally organized and they lack adequate programs for registration, collection, 
and auditing. There is also a lack of human and physical capital resources to handle the 
increased number of taxpayers. Addressing the resource constraint will not solve all the tax 
service problems, but it needs to be a starting point. In order to ensure that resources are 
available to the modernization of the tax service some extraordinary measures may be required. 
CIT governments could divert a fixed portion of increases in real revenues to the improvement 
of the tax administration service. The fixed percentage of revenues could exclude fines and 
penalties and would be enacted with the sunset provision that the legislature must review and 
reapprove the fund after a specified period of time.
Third, tax policy reform need to carefully assess different options against explicit economic 
objectives, to be comprehensive, and to be swiftly enacted and left unchanged for some time. 
In practice, the experience of most CITs did not meet these standards.
A good portion of the tax reform process in CITs has been carried out without an explicit 
evaluation of how well the different proposals would perform against standard objectives, 
including revenue performance, economic neutrality, tax burden distribution, and simplicity 
and administrative feasibility. Shortchanging the preparation stage led inevitably to ad hoc 
continuous patching of the system, creating confusion among tax administrators and taxpayers 
alike and creating uncertainty for domestic and national investors.124
The two main choices for tax policy reform in transitional economies were to immediately 
replicate a model western tax system or to develop a tax system that, while modem, would 
take the realities o f the transitional environment into account. In practice, there was a varying 
mixture of the two approaches and rarely with the right balance. Countries that immediately 
adopted western-designed taxes often encountered significant problems because of the incom­
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patibility of these taxes with accounting practices or the lack of familiarity of tax administrators 
and taxpayers with the new taxes.125 Some of these problems should have been expected, but 
they were aggravated by the lack of preparations for the reform or the failure to implement 
other supporting reforms, such as accounting or ownership titling. On the other hand, those 
countries that tried to adapt the tax system to their unique transitional structures often ran into 
the problem of continued change under different pressures, bringing more instability and 
uncertainty into the transition process.
With hindsight, the report card on tax reform is one of missed opportunity. Ideally, CITs 
should have adopted a tax structure that was simple and well adapted to the institutional and 
administrative constraints of the transition environment. Then they should have kept these 
systems stable for several years and used that time to modernize and upgrade their tax administra­
tion systems and educate their taxpayers. In many cases the reform of the tax structure replicating 
“best practice” in western market economies came too soon.
The report card on tax reform efforts in CITs comes up short against many of the standard 
objectives of tax reform. Although there are exceptions, most CIT tax systems have not accom­
plished the objective of simplicity. Often there are unnecessary taxes, and the standard taxes 
are too complex. Simplicity will require that taxes have fewer rates and the broadest possible 
base, eliminating many exemptions and deductions. Simplicity will also require getting rid of 
nuisance taxes and other taxes with low revenue potential, making tax declarations simple and 
clear, and demanding only from taxpayers information that is relevant to tax enforcement.
Tax systems in CIT also come up short against the objective of economic neutrality. Here, 
many CITs appear not to have learned the lessons from their own past or even those from 
western countries. Many CITs have continued their interventionist legacies, and the trend would 
appear to have worsened in recent times. Special treatment leads to distortions, abuses, increased 
compliance and administrative costs, and taxpayer inequities and resentment. CIT tax systems, 
for the most part, have not provided the desired level of stability in tax institutions. Continuous 
changes in the tax structure have contributed to increased administrative and compliance costs, 
have facilitated tax evasion, and have discouraged economic activity. The tax system must 
retain some measure of stability in order to create a positive climate for economic activity and 
to allow tax administrators and taxpayers to adjust to the new system. CITs also need to lower 
compliance costs for taxpayers. This goal will depend to a large extent on keeping the tax 
laws simple, but also on eliminating unnecessary requirements, such as filing balance sheets 
and income statements every quarter or physically queuing for a long time to pay taxes.
The new tax systems in CITs have not been particularly successful in generating adequate 
revenues either, however, here it is all too easy to be inappropriately harsh given the extraordi­
nary circumstances of prolonged and significant declines in real economic activity during the 
transition.
It is too early to judge the impact of CIT tax systems on income redistribution. On the 
whole, early fears on aggressive use of the tax system to accomplish income redistribution 
objectives have not materialized. Despite their cultural legacy, or perhaps in reaction to it, CIT 
policies in this area have been moderate. Nevertheless, widespread tax evasion is likely to 
make CIT tax systems inequitable in both a horizontal and a vertical sense.
Finally, the success o f tax reform has depended to a large extent on institutional and 
structural reform throughout the economy. The evidence seems to indicate that CITs that moved 
quickly to restructure their economies have fared better over the past five years than countries 
that have been slow to implement reform (World Bank, 1996). Too often CITs that have been 
less successful in the tax reform arena adopted a strategy of approving the new tax laws and 
waiting for the new system to operate by itself. These countries have been slower in modernizing 
their accounting systems, strengthening and enforcing bankruptcy laws, and reforming their 
entire legal systems.
NOTES
1. CITs refers to all previous ccntrally planned or socialist countries in Central and F.astem Europe
and in the former Soviet Union. This chapter does not address the cases of China, Vietnam,
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North Korea, Cuba, or Mongolia. A distinctive feature of this group of countries is that with 
the exception of Mongolia the varying degrees of economic and fiscal reform are taking place 
in the context of authoritarian regimes.
2. This chapter focuses on tax policy and tax administration and does not address intergovernmen­
tal Finance issues. This is done to keep the chapter to a manageable length. This is an important 
omission because in many cases the shape and impetus for tax policy in CITs has come from 
intergovernmental tensions. In addition, important tax administration issues in CITs are closely 
intertwined with the structure of intergovernmental relations.
3. We use this label to designate the same group of countries now in transition from their former 
regimes.
4. Also see Kopits (1991b) and Owens (1991b) for additional cross-country comparisons. The 
comparison of tax revenue structures in CPEs and western market economies can be misleading 
because of the much larger role played by state enterprises in CPEs.
5. Bird and Casanegra (1992) have usefully termed this “boutique” tax administration (in contrast 
to “mass" administration).
6. These taxes were not like a westem-style turnover (gross receipts) tax.
7. Revenues collected from wage and payroll taxes were used to fund social expenditures, 
housing, education, culture, health care, and pensions (Gandhi and Mihaljek, 1992).
8. However, workers in the Soviet Union, for example, received payroll slips biweekly on which 
both gross and net salaries were reported.
9. This argument is made by Bogetic and Hillman (1994). See also Blejer and Szapary (1991)and 
Bakes (1991).
10. The wage fund was one of several institutionalized vehicles for the distribution of enterprises’ 
net profits.
11. Poland, for example, set the rate of return on the “founding fund” at 32 percent. The founding 
fund was defined as the net book value of the enterprise in 1983, inclusive of any subsequent 
capital transfers (Gray, 1991).
12. This point is emphasized in many studies of taxation in socialist planned economies. See, for 
example, Gandhi and Milhaljek (1992).
13. Government revenue from “financial repression” has also been a common phenomenon in 
developing countries. See Giovannini and M. de Melo (1990).
14. An often cited example: until recently Romania and Bulgaria imposed income taxes on childless 
persons, purportedly in an attempt to promote higher birth rates.
15. The public sector importance of these activities was evidenced during the transition as firms 
began to divest these responsibilities and increased pressure on government budgets. See 
Bird, F.bel, and Wallich (1995).
16. Kornai (1986, 1992) called CPEs’ taxes “soft taxes.” See Owens (1991b).
17. There are no exact Figures on the composition of these different items. Kodrzycki (1993) 
reports that in the late 1980s, nontax revenues accounted for 8 percent of GDP on average, 
twice the corresponding level for western economies during the same period.
18. The Chinese have carried the negotiation approach one step further with the use of formal 
contracts. The provincial government negotiates a tax contract with state-owned enterprises, 
usually stating a quota amount of tax to be paid, but offering lower marginal tax rates to 
enterprises that exceed the quota amount. Though the contracts were supposedly limited to 
the enterprise income tax, they were also used widely for the value added tax. The practice 
of tax contracting was eliminated by the 1994 reform (Bahl, 1997).
19. The absence of conventional tax distortion in CPEs did not mean, of course, that these countries 
escaped economic inefficiencies. In fact, the inefficiencies associated with the pervasive inter­
ference of the state in the allocation of resources throughout the economy were quite extensive. 
In addition to the inefficiency of decisions, central planning eroded incentives to innovate, 
work, and save. The common state of affairs was an economy with excess demand controlled 
by physical rationing and shortages in production (Kopits, 1991b; Kornai, 1990).
20. Controlled prices meant that enterprises could not alter prices or wages to shift the burden 
of payroll, profit, or turnover taxes onto consumers or workers. I-abor supply could hardly
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be affected by taxation due to restrictions on labor mobility and monetary and most in-kind 
compensation, however, higher enterprise taxes could have been shifted to labor if they 
reduced the size of the wage fund. Also, the high rate income taxes imposed on some 
professionals were probably successful in discouraging "undesirable behavior."
21. Nevertheless, personal savings accounts were common in many CPEs, and a substantial portion 
were voluntary savings. An important reason was the incompleteness of the social safety net, 
including low pensions, and the lack of efficient insurance mechanisms. Savings accounts also 
existed in part due to shortages in consumer products. These unspent balances led to the 
monetary overhang in Russia and other countries in transition prior to the liberalization of 
prices. This overhang was later eliminated by inflation and also, in Russia, by reneging on 
large denomination ruble bills.
22. Estimates from a number of studies suggest that from 15 to 30 percent of the labor force in 
CPEs was hoarded labor (Gora, 1991). The impact of excess-wage taxes is discussed in Section 
V. The overemployment associated with labor hoarding resulted in low labor productivity in 
CPEs (Ray, 1991).
23. For example, Party members and the Nomenklatura were frequently granted access to western 
products and other goods in short supply.
24. One of the primary arguments for the retention of the EWT in Russia in the recent past was 
that it compressed the income distribution and limited the growth in disposable income (Tait 
and Erbas, 1995). See also Marrese (1994).
25. The unofficial economy in the Soviet Union apparently grew significantly over a period of 
the last thirty years.
26. For a discussion of the strategies and problems related to transitioning fiscal and economic 
policy, see Shome and Escolano (1993), OECD (1991a, b), Tanzi (1992), and Go (1994).
27. These choices at the beginning of the transition might be categorized by what Feldstein (1976) 
calls “tax design," or instituting a system from scratch with no regard for the preexisting 
conditions, and “tax reform,” which does take into account historical conditions.
28. A distinguishing characteristic of most CITs has been the relative importance in the economy 
of large, state-owned conglomerates inherited from the previous regime. The size and impor­
tance of these conglomerates have steadily shrunk as conversion and privatization have pro­
ceeded. The presence of these large conglomerates, on the one hand, has dampened the 
supply response to tax policies relative to that expected in market or even developing econo­
mies (Kolodko, 1993). On the other hand, state enterprises have been more compliant (although 
considerable arrears have commonly occurred) than the rapidly growing private sector, thus 
providing an element of stability and continuity. It has been argued that this may not have 
been totally negative during the transition. Successful tax enforcement of the most dynamic 
sector could slow private initiative and growth. See Bogetic and Hillman (1994). Bahl and 
Martinez-Vazquez (1992) raise similar issues for the case of developing countries.
29. A modem westem-style global personal income tax should be introduced much later in the 
reform process.
30. McLure (1991b) also advocated the adoption in CITs of the simplified alternative tax (SAT), 
a form of cash-flow tax.
31. See, for example, Boskin and McLure (1990), Owens (1991b), and Tanzi (1994).
32. There was also an evolution of emphasis on equity in the 1960s to neutrality in the 1980s 
(McLure 1989).
33- For example, Hussain and Stem (1993) make the point that the taxation of intermediate goods 
may be temporarily desirable in CITs to compensate for existing distortions and as a way to 
bring into the tax net self-employed and small firms, which might otherwise escape taxation. 
We have also seen that in the same vein Shome and Escolano (1993) recommended the 
temporary use of EWTs and export duties or high import tariffs.
34. For a discussion of tax policy in developing countries, see Bird (1992), Boskin and McLure
(1990), Burgess and Stem (1993), Khalilzadeh-Shirazi and Shah (1991), Thirsk (1990), and 
Newberry and Stem (1987). For a review of tax administration issues in developing countries, 
see Bird and Casanegra (1992).
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35. Property and natural resource taxes are not included in the discussion due to the lack of 
sufficient information across CITs.
36. State enterprises also had access to other funds, in particular off-budget accounts. See, for 
example, Le Houerou, Gold, and Katash (1994).
37. For a discussion of the role of property rights in transition economies, see Shleifer and Vishny
(1993).
38. These taxes are discussed below.
39. See, for example, McLure (1995b) for a critical look at Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic.
40. Actually the general tax rate in Hungary is 13 percent, but an additional 23 percent is levied 
on distributed profits. This reverses the normal use of split rates to achieve dividend relief, 
such as in the case of Germany.
41. Three countries (Bulgaria, Poland, and the Slovak Republic) have a general rate of 40 percent.
42. Multiple tax rates differing by type of enterprise and economic sector were not uncommon 
until recently. For example, in Bulgaria in 1993, state (controlled by the central government) 
enterprise profits were taxed at a rate of 52 percent and municipal enterprises were taxed at 
a rate of 42 percent (Bogetic and Hillman, 1994). Additional levies existed on profitable 
enterprises. Commercial banks, all state owned, were taxed at a rate of 50 percent, except for 
the State Savings Bank, which was taxed at a rate of 70 percent. Private enterprises and foreign 
ventures were generally taxed at lower rates, and rates vary with the level of profit and with 
ownership composition. In Uzbekistan, until recent reforms, while the rate was officially set 
at 18 percent, it varied from 3 percent to 60 percent, depending on the economic sector and 
the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers.
43. In a few areas, the enterprise profit tax in CITs can be more generous than is common in 
western countries. For example, it is common in CITs to allow enterprises a deduction for 
reserves against bad debts and other contingencies for all types of enterprises and not just 
insurance companies and other financial institutions as is more commonly the case in western 
countries. These more generous provisions may be justified by the much higher incidence of 
bad debts in CITs, however.
44. Croatia appears to be the only country that allows the adjustment of loss carry-forward for 
inflation. In the case of assets, losses can be reevaluated each year at the industrial inflation 
rate plus an opportunity cost of 3 percent.
45. Romania has been considering the introduction of a Chilean-type system of inflation adjustment.
46. Croatia's “protective interest deduction" is similar to the “allowance for corporate equity” (ACE) 
proposed by Devereux and Freeman (1991). In Croatia, interest and dividend income are 
exempt, and no other adjustments for inflation are provided in the enterprise income tax. The 
reforms in Croatia were spearheaded by a team of German advisors led by Manfred Rose. See 
Martinez-Vazquez (1995).
47. In reality, many countries allow a variety of methods, and several restrict them to historic 
costs and/or weighted average costs.
48. See Shome and Escolano (1993) for a discussion of early depreciation measures, at times rather 
unconventional, in the Central Asian CITs. McLure (1995a) reports that Kazakhstan adopted 
a pooled asset account system for depreciation. There are concerns over whether or not 
depreciation allowances on these bases (historic costs and straight line) have been adequate 
for capital replacement (Tanzi, 1994).
49. The extent of tax incentives and special provisions, of course, varies across CITs. Hungary 
still has the most complex system, leading some observers to call it a “Swiss cheese tax" 
(McLure, 1995b).
50. See Shah (1995) for a review of these experiences.
51. Examples are Estonia, Romania, and to a lesser extent, Slovenia.
52. Countries with this type of provision include Georgia, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, Kyrgizstan, 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
53. This is practiced in Croatia (Martinez-Vazquez, 1995).
54. Up to 1995, presidential decrees were often used in the Russian Federation to grant tax benefits
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to entire sectors (e.g., the energy sector) and specific individual enterprises (e.g., the Zil 
automobile company in Moscow, OECD, 1995b).
55. This has been the case in Ukraine, Latvia, Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and for 
the most pan Kazakhstan.
56. These general tax holidays are more costly and not more effective than targeted investment 
incentives. See, for example, McLure (1997).
57. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Slemrod (1995).
58. The taxation of foreign income made by nationals abroad is a less important question for CITs 
for the time being.
59. If the home country employs a territorial system (it taxes only income earned at home) tax 
incentive to foreign investors in the host country can be as effective as those offered to domestic 
investors. If the home country taxes global income but gives a credit for foreign taxes, CIT 
incentives to foreign companies are equivalent to a transfer of CIT funds to foreign treasuries. 
This transfer does not occur, however, if the foreign investor is in an "excess credit" position 
(foreign credits exceed the tax that would be paid on the same income in the home country). 
It is not uncommon for corporations in countries subject to a universal taxation to be in an 
excess credit position in their home country. Tax incentives offered to foreign investors from 
home countries with worldwide taxation may also be effective if the home country allows the 
“deferral” of repatriation of profits or has signed a tax treaty with the host country with a “tax 
sparing” clause. This latter allows credits for the taxes that would have been paid if the host 
country did not provide the tax incentive. See Slemrod (1995).
60. The exceptions are Croatia, Lithuania, and Albania.
61. See Tait (1988) and Flanagan (1992). Many CITs have experimented with other forms of TIPs 
to control the internal wage bill of state enterprises.
62. The United States ratified a tax treaty with Kazakstan in late 1996. This would not have 
happened with the EWT in effect, since an income tax that does not allow deduction for 
wages is not eligible for foreign tax credits in the United States.
63. An EWT in combination with the standard profit tax can approximate the base of the VAT 
levied upon the full income of the enterprise. Tanzi (1991) makes this observation with respect 
to the Russian EWT, which was repealed in 1996.
64. The transition problems associated with the introduction of a cash-flow income tax would 
have been less pronounced in CITs because of the smaller amount of undepreciated capital 
in the economy and less outstanding debt. The less pronounced differences in the distribution 
of income may also have been a positive factor for the adoption of a consumption approach 
to income taxes in CITs, however, CITs still would have been subject to the uncertainty of 
whether the United States, and perhaps other countries with global income taxes, would have 
allowed foreign tax credits for cash flow taxes paid in CITs. For a discussion of the general 
issues, see McLure (1992), and of the crediting issue, see McLure and Zodrow (1995, 1996b).
65. Latvia and Lithuania also exempt all capital gains. Croatia only exempts capital gains from 
immovable property held for over three years, and Albania has no provisions concerning 
capital gains.
66. The failure to mesh individual and company taxes creates significant opportunities for tax 
arbitrage. This is the case, for example, when there is no tax on interest income and interest 
costs are allowed as a deduction.
67. This has been a repeated prescription for income tax reform in CITs. See, for example, McLure 
(1991a) and Tanzi (1991).
68. CITs with final withholding taxes on dividend income include Belarus, Czech Republic, Hun­
gary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Turkmenistan. The use of final 
withholding taxes is less common for interest income (Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Slovak 
Republic) and for some types of interest (Poland and Estonia) and royalties (Albania).
69. Such is the case, for example, in Bulgaria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, or Russia.
70. The inspiration for the new legislation came from multiple sources, not the least of which is 
Hussey and Lubick (1995).
71. There may have also been an incentive during the transition to switch compensation from
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money wages to fringe benefits because of the high burdens on labor income implied by 
“excess wage taxes” and rather steep payroll and social security taxes, discussed below. Le 
Houerou, Gold, and Katash (1994), however, found little evidence of this type of switching 
in the Russian Federation up to the end of 1993.
72. Hungary taxes cash fringe benefits at the individual level, but all fringe benefits are taxed at 
the company level at a rate of 44 percent. The highest individual marginal rate in Hungary is 
48 percent.
73. This is an approach openly used in Bulgaria and Poland. Most CITs also disallow or limit 
travel and entertainment expenses and other selected categories of expenses which can possibly 
be used to the nonbusiness-related benefit of employees and managers.
74. It is common not to allow as a deduction the contributions to pensions or the payroll taxes 
paid by employees.
75. Personal and dependent allowances are defined in some CITs in terms of monthly minimum 
wages, such as in the case of the Central Asian CITs, Lithuania, and Moldova, or in terms of 
personal allowances, as in the case of Croatia. In Poland, children’s allowances are paid directly 
to mothers and there is no provision in the personal income tax (PIT) code for this deduction.
76. In Latvia, taxable income up to 60,000 lats (approximately $115,000) is subject to a single rate 
of 25 percent, and income over that amount is subject to a rate of 10 percent.
77. Over one-third of the CITs have this top rate.
78. No information is available on what percentage of taxpayers is subject to the top rates. In 
most OECD countries only a small percentage of taxpayers is subject to the top rates.
79. In the early years of the transition, observers feared that inherited socialist values would lead 
CITs to put undue emphasis on the goal of equalization and distribution. Even though many 
CITs first introduced substantially higher marginal rates, the trend in the continued reforms 
has been toward more moderate rates.
80. The use of minimum wages for this purpose has been a common practice in many I.atin 
American countries which have been subject to rapid inflation over the past two decades and 
decided not to use a full indexation approach for inflation. There is no uniform practice in 
OECD countries with respect to the automatic (full or partial) indexation for inflation of 
personal allowances, minimum exempt thresholds, or tax rate brackets. There are countries 
that have used both indexation and ad hoc discretionary changes, and some have switched 
from one system to the other.
81. See, for example, U.S. Department of the Treasury (1992) and Messere (1995). To avoid double 
taxation, measures can be taken at the individual taxpayer level or at the company level. At 
the individual taxpayer level shareholder relief may be granted by exempting or partially 
exempting dividends or by attempting to integrate both taxes. This latter approach involves 
imputation methods that tax the dividends at the personal level but give full or partial credit 
for the tax that give relief at the company level are less commonly used because company 
income taxes are used as withholding taxes for the harder to tax individual incomes. Relief 
at the company level can be provided by granting lower tax rates for distributed profits or by 
granting a deduction (partial or in full) for the distributed profits. One of the advantages of 
consumption-based cash-flow taxes is that they generally do not require integration because 
dividends are exempt.
82. This is the case in Russia and smaller FSU countries, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Moldova, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and Bulgaria.
83- This is the case of Belarus, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Poland, Romania, Slovak Repub­
lic, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine.
84. This is the case in Serbia and Slovenia.
85. These are Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Serbia, Poland, Bulgaria, Croatia, Moldova, and 
Albania.
86. Lithuania and Turkmenistan with 31 percent, Kazakhstan with 32 percent, and Estonia with 
33 percent.
87. Other choices of sales taxes, such as a multiple-stage turnover tax or even a single-stage sales
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lax at the production and wholesale levels, probably were inferior choices because of the 
arbitrary effective taxation across sectors and their undesirable economic effects. These general 
issues are discussed in many sources; Shome and Escolano (1993) and Summers and Sunley 
(1995) provide the most extensive discussions of indirect taxation and the VAT in CITs.
88. It is necessary, however, to have effective border controls at least for products that can be 
consumed by households. As we see below, the lack of border controls within most of the 
FSU has heavily influenced the nature of the VAT adopted.
89. CIS stands for the Commonwealth of Independent States, which comprises Russia and all other 
former Soviet republics except for the Baltic countries.
90. See International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (1996).
91. Some CIS countries have in the recent past embarked upon comprehensive independent 
reform efforts; this has been the case, for example, in Kazakhstan (McLure, 1995a).
92. The choice of this high rate of 28 percent was driven by the short-term objective of matching 
the revenues collected with the old turnover tax. This may say, if computations were correct, 
that the rates of the old turnover tax were quite high or that there was some degree of cascading 
associated with the old turnover tax. After a few months, a lower rate of 15 percent was 
introduced in Russia for most foodstuffs. Uzbekistan originally adopted a rate of 30 percent.
93- Belarus used a subtraction method VAT at all levels (Bird, 1995). In all CIS countries, there 
were problems with the definition or measurement of the margin. Supposedly, the margin is 
the firm’s markup or the difference between the price paid for the goods and the price at 
which they are sold. The practice in CIS countries at the beginning of the transition is reviewed 
in Shome and Escolano (1993).
94. This presumably encouraged self-construction.
95. Russia and the rest of the CIS countries also use a destination method for trade outside the 
CIS.
96. The common base for imports for VATs in the EU is customs value plus the tariff plus any 
excises that may apply. This is the base for imports commonly adopted in CITs in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Some CIS countries use a base that includes only customs value (e.g., Georgia 
and Azerbaijan), customs value plus tariff (e.g., Ukraine), or customs value, tariff, and excises 
(e.g., Russia and Uzbekistan).
97. Tait (1988) provides an interesting discussion of the difficult choices to be made by CITs 
concerning VAT exemptions.
98. The effect of preretail exemptions, including those for small businesses, differs under the 
credit method and the subtraction method. Taxes are higher under the credit method. See, 
for example, McLure (1987).
99. However, there is less clear justification for taxing other commodities at these lower rates. 
For example, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic all tax hotel services at reduced rates.
100. Other forms of indirect taxation exist, but they are not reviewed here. For example, Kazakhstan 
levies a securities transaction tax on new issues of nongovernmental securities, including 
stocks and bonds, and on secondary transactions of these same securities (McLure, 1995a).
101. For example, a presidential decree in Belarus in August 1996 raised levies on all imports from 
10 to 150 percent and established that 75 percent of the goods on sale in Belarusian stores 
must be domestically produced goods (Tax Notes International, 1996).
102. See Section III and also Tanzi (1993, 1991); Bakes (1991); Gray (1991); and Bahl and Wallace 
(1995).
103. Go (1994) reports decreases as percentages of GDP from 60.2 percent (1987) to 34.2 percent 
(1991) in Bulgaria, from 61.5 percent (1988) to 52.9 percent (1991) in Hungary, from 48.0 
percent (1988) to 29.2 percent (1991) in Poland, and from 51.1 percent (1989) to 40.1 percent
(1991) in Romania.
104. These declines in revenues continue in many of these countries in more recent years. See, 
for example, Khankevich (1996) and Hemming, Cheasty, and Lahiri (1995).
105. Some of these issues are discussed in Hemming, Cheasty, and Lahiri (1995) and Shome and 
Escolano (1993).
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106. For example, Khankevich (1996) estimates that there were ten major structural changes and 
over 100 modifications to the Belarusian tax system between 1992 and 1996.
107. See McLure (1995b) for surveys of taxpayers.
108. The Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic acknowledge that deliberate and inadvertent 
tax evasion may occur in 20 to 25 percent of all cases. See McLure (1995b) and Summers and 
Sunley (1995).
109. The new tax code for Kazakhstan, which contained both tax policy and tax administration 
measures, is an exception to this pattern. Even in this case, however, there was little or no 
preparation for tax administrators or education for taxpayers (McLure, 1995a) McLure, Martinez- 
Vazquez and Wallace (1997).
110. Typically, a preparation of twelve to eighteen months is the minimum recommended for a 
new VAT. See, for example, Tait (1988). The following anecdote provided by McLure (1995b) 
illustrates this point. “In early 1992 a prominent member of the Russian Parliament told Dr. 
McLure that Gaidar had told him at a reception one night in late 1991 that the VAT was going 
to be introduced. The member asked Gaidar if the tax administration could handle it. Gaidar 
responded affirmatively. Later the same night Lazarev (head of the lax service) told the member 
that Gaidar had subsequently asked him whether the tax service could implement the VAT. 
Even though Lazarev responded negatively, the VAT was introduced."
111. This is in contrast to the experience of nontransition countries, which typically have experi­
enced unexpected increases in revenue as a consequence of the introduction of the VAT (Tait, 
1988).
112. In Hungary, the ratio of profits tax relief to collected profits tax revenues rose from 17 percent 
in 1989 to 26 percent in 1991 and reached 36 percent in 1993 (Semjen, 1995). During 1994, 
it was estimated that the Russian Federation did forego up to 2.5 percent of GDP in tax 
expenditures (OECD, 1995a).
113. Such countries as Belarus that lagged behind in tax reform and insisted on the applicability 
of the old accounting system may have had the advantage of avoiding the confusion and 
revenue consequences of adopting new taxes without having changed the accounting systems 
(Bird and Tsiopolous, 1994).
114. See Kamite and Dovladbekova (1995).
115. See McLure (1995b) for surveys in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and de Melo 
and Ofer (1994) for Russia.
116. The practice has been for enterprises to set separate trading firms and then use appropriate 
pricing to transfer most profits to the artificial firm, which may not be registered at all with 
the tax authorities. This practice is a version of western practices of shifting income to tax 
haven countries and similar to what is known in U.S. interstate corporate income taxation as 
the “Delaware company” avoidance problem. This involves attempts by corporations to shift 
their profits to artificial or shell companies in states in which these companies are lightly taxed, 
such as Delaware, or to companies in states with no corporate income tax, such as Nevada. 
Many states eliminate this problem by combining the income and apportionment factors of 
related corporations deemed to be engaged in a unitary business.
117. This appears to be happening in Russia. Semjen (1995) indicates this is also a practice in 
Hungary.
118. In Kazakhstan the new tax code prohibits tax administration staff to work for other organizations 
and to carry official duties for taxpayers about whom a conflict of interest may arise McLure, 
Martinez-Vazquez and Wallace (1997).
119. Dual subordination of tax officials and other issues related to the control of employees in 
deconcentrated offices are discussed below.
120. With international technical assistance, Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and others have ongoing 
pilot projects for the reorganization of the tax administrations along functional lines.
121. For example, in 1994, the main office of the Belarusian state tax inspectorate had only 135 employ­
ees, of whom forty-four were in separate investigative services (Bird and Tsiopolous, 1994).
122. In Russia and other CIS countries, taxpayers still write separate checks to each level of govern­
ment sharing revenues of a particular tax. Often, there are differences in the rate of payment
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to each level of government, but sometimes what appears to be better collection rates for 
local and regional governments is simply due to the fact that taxpayers can more easily afford 
to pay the lower rates they owe to local governments. The practice of writing separate checks 
increases the compliance costs for taxpayers, but it endures because subnational governments 
mistrust the central government’s willingness and ability to hand over funds once it has them.
123. These issues have been discussed frequently in the literature on intergovernmental fiscal 
relations in CITs. See Bird, Ebel, and Wallich, 1995; Wallich, 1994; Martinez-Vazquez and 
Boex, 1996b) McLure, Martinez-Vazquez, and Wallace (1997).
124. There have been exceptions to the lack of adequate preparation, such as Kazakstan’s reform 
in 1994 and the new tax code under preparation in Russia.
125. The adoption of a VAT in Bulgaria is an example.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors are grateful to Charles McLure, Richard Bird, Emil Sunley, Roy Bahl, Sijbren Crossen
and Lev Freinkman for very helpful comments. Grant Black provided significant background
research and materials.
REFERENCES
Aslund, A. (1992). The Post-Soviet Economy: Soviet an d  Western Perspectives, St. Martin's Press, New 
York.
Bahl, R. (1997). Central-provincial-local relation: The revenue side, Taxation in China (D.J.S. Brean, 
ed.). Routledge, Inc., New York.
Bahl, R. and J. Martinez-Vazquez (1992). The nexus between tax policy and tax administration in 
developing countries, Improving Tax Administration in Developing Countries (R. Bird and M. 
Casanegra de Jantscher, eds.), International Monetary Foundation, Washington, D.C.
Bahl, R. and C. Wallich (1995). Intergovernmental fiscal relations in the Russian federation, Decentral­
ization o f  The Socialist Slate (R. M. Bird, R. D. Ebel and C. I. Wallich, eds.), The World Bank, 
Washington, D.C.
Bakes, M. (1991). Tax reform in Central and Eastern Europe, Australian Tax Forum, 8(1): 117-128.
Balcerowicz, L. and A. Gelb (1995). Macropolicies in transition to a market economy: A three-year 
perspective, Proceedings o f  the World B ank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 
1994, (M. Bruno and B. Pleskovic, eds.), World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Bird, R. M. (1992). Tax Policy an d  Economic Development, the Johns Hopkins University Press, Balti­
more.
Bird, R. M. (1995). Indirect taxes in Belarus: VAT by subtraction, Tax Notes International, 2(9): 
589-599.
Bird, R. M. and M. Casanegra de Jantscher, eds. (1992). Improving Tax Administration in Developing 
Countries, International Monetary Foundation, Washington, D.C.
Bird, R. M., R. D. Ebel, and C. I. Wallich, eds. (1995). Decentralization o f  the Socialist State, World 
Bank, Washington, D.C.
Bird, R. M. and T. Tsiopolous (1994). “Taxation and the Development of Private Enterprise in Belarus," 
mimeograph. World Bank, Washington D.C.
Blejer, M. I. and G. Szapary (1991). Market oriented reform of fiscal policy, Markets an d  Politicians: 
Politized Economic Choice (A. L. Hillman, ed.), Kluwer, Boston.
Bogetic, Z. and Hillman, A. L. (1994). The tax base in transition: The case of Bulgaria, The World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper, p. 1267 (March). World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Boskin, M. J. and C. E. McLure, Jr. (1990). World Tax Reform: Case Studies o f  Developed an d  
Developing Countries, International Center for Economic Growth, San Francisco.
Burgess, R. and N. Stem (1993). Taxation and development, Jou rn al o f  Economic Literature, 31 
762-830 (June).
Citrin, D. A. and A. K. Lahiri, eds. (1995). “Policy Experiences and Issues in the Baltics, Russia, and 
Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union,” occasional paper <»133 (Dec.), International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
962 M art in ez-Va z q u e z  an d  M c N ab
Cnossen, S. (1991). Design of the value added tax: Lessons from experience, Tax Policy in Developing 
Countries, (j. Khalizadeh-Shirazi and A. Shah eds.), The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
de Melo, M. and G. Ofer (1994). “Private Service Firms in a Transitional Economy: Findings of a 
Survey in St. Petersburg," World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Devereux, M. P. and H. Freeman (1991). A general neutral profits tax, Fiscal Studies, 12(3): 1­
15.
Easterly, W. and S. Rebelo (1993). Fiscal policy and economic growth: An empirical investigation. 
Jou rnal o f  Monetary Economics, 32: 417-458.
Edwards, S. (1992). Stabilization and liberation policies for the economies in transition: Latin American 
lessons for Eastern Europe, The Emergence o f  Market Economies in Eastern Europe (C. Clague 
and G. C. Rausner, eds.), Blackwell, New York, pp. 129-159.
Feldstein, M. (1976). On the theory of tax reform, Journal o f  Public Economics, 6(1-2): 77-104.
Flanagan, R. J. (1992). Wages and wage policies in market economies: Lessons for Central and Eastern 
Europe, OECD Economic Studies, 0(18): 105-132.
Gandhi, V. P. and D. Mihaljek (1991). Scope for reform in socialist tax systems, Fiscal Policies in 
Economies in Transition (V. Tanzi, ed.), International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
Giovannini, G. and M. de Melo (1990). “Government Revenue from Financial Repression,” WPS 533, 
World Bank (Nov.) .
Go, D. S. (1994). External shocks, adjustment policies and investment in a developing economy: 
Illustrainos from a forward-looking CGE model of the Philippines, Journal o f  Development 
Economics 44(1): 229-61.
Gora, M. (1991). Shock therapy for the Polish labour market, Internationa! Labour Review, 130(2): 
145-163.
Gray, C. W. (1991). Tax systems in the reforming socialist economics of Europe, Communist Economies 
an d  Economic Transformation 3(1): 63-79.
Hemming, R., A. Cheasty, and A. K. Lahiri (1995). The revenue decline, Policy Experiences an d  Issues 
in the Baltics, Russia, an d  Other Countries o f  the Former Soviet Union (D. A. Citrin and A. K. 
Lahiri, eds.), occasional paper »133, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. (Dec.).
Hogan, W. W. (1991). Economic reforms in the sovereign states of the former Soviet Union, Brookings 
Papers on Economic Actitnty, 2. 303-317.
Hussain, A. and N. Stem (1993). The role of the state, ownership, and taxation in transitional 
economies, Economics o f  Transition, 2(1): 61-87.
Hussey, W. M. and D. C. Lubick (1995). Basic world tax code an d  commentary: a  project sponsored 
by the H aw ard University International Tax Progam. Tax Analysts, Arlington, VA.
Ickes, B. W. and J. Slemrod (1991). “Tax Implementation Issues in the Transition from a Planned 
Economy,” proceedings of the 47th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, 
St. Petersburg, Florida, pp. 384-399.
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (1996). Central an d  East European Tax Directory, 
Amsterdam.
Jackman, R. (1994). Economic policy and employment in the transition economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe: What have we learned? International Labour Review, 733(3): 327-345.
Karnite, R. and I. Dovladbekova (1995). Institutions o f  Public Finance in Latina, Institute of Econom­
ics, Latvian Academy of Sciences, Riga.
Khankevich, L. (1996). “Report: Taxation System: The Republic of Belarus,” mimeograph.
Khalilzadeh-Shirazi, J. and A. Shah, eds. (1991). Tax Policy in Developing Countries, World Bank, 
Washington, D.C.
Kodrzychi, Y. K. (1993). Tax reform in newly emerging market economies, New England Economic 
Reinew: 3-17 (Nov./Dec.).
Kodrzychi, Y. K. and E. M. Zolt (1994). Tax issues arising from privatization in the formerly socialist 
countries, Law an d  Policy in InternationaI Business, 25(2): 609-633 (winter).
Kolodko, G. W. (1993). Perverse effect of fiscal adjustment in transition economies, Economics o f  
Transition, 1(3): 345-355.
Kopits, G. (1991). Fiscal reforms in the European economies in transition, in OECD, The Transition 
to a  Market Economy, OECD, Paris.
Ta x  S y st em s  in T r a n s it io n  Ec o n o m ie s 963
Kopits, G. and E. Offerdal (1994). Fiscal policy in transition economies: A major challenge, Finance & 
Development, 31(4): 10-13.
Kornai J. (1986). The soft budget constraint, Kyklos, 3 9  3-30.
Kornai, J. (1990). The Road to a  Free Economy: Shifting from  a  Socialist System, the Case o f  Hungary, 
Norton, New York.
Komai, J. (1992). The postsocialist transition and the state: Reflections in the light of Hungarian fiscal 
problems, American Economics Review, 82(2): 1-21.
Le Houerou, P., E. Gold, and S. Katash (1994). “Budget Coverage and Government Finance in the 
Russian Federation (Analytical and Methodological Issues),” World Bank Internal Discussion 
Paper *137 (Jan.).
Marrese, M. (1994). An incomes policy for Russia? International Monetary Fund Papers on Policy 
Analysis and Assessment, PPAA/94/4, pp. 20.
Martinez-Vazquez, J. (1995). Croatia. Tax Policy an d  Administration, World Bank background report, 
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Martinez-Vazquez, J. and J. Boex (1996a). Tax reform in Croatia examined, Tax Notes International.
Martinez-Vazquez, J. and J. Boex (1996b). “An Overview of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in 
the Baltic States,” proceedings of the National Tax Association.
McKinnon, R. I. (1991). Financial control in the transition from classical socialism to a market economy, 
Jou rn al o f  Economic Perspectives, 5: 107-122.
McLure, C. E. Jr. (1987). The Value-Added Tax Key to Deficit Reduction? American Enterprise Institute, 
Washington, D.C.
McLure, C. E. Jr. (1989). Analysis and reform of the Colombian tax system, Tax Reform in Developing 
Countries (M. Gillis, ed.), Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina.
McLure, C. E. Jr. (1990). “Taxation in Centrally Planned Economies and Private Market Economies," 
mimeograph. Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, California.
McLure, C. E. Jr. (1991a). “Tax policy for economies in transition from socialism,” Tax Notes Interna­
tional, 3- 347-353 (March).
McLure, C. E. Jr. (1991b). Tax policy in Bulgaria, Bulletin fo r  International Fiscal Documentation, 
43(5): 235-247.
McLure, C. E. Jr. (1991c). Alternatives for the taxation of income from capital in reforming socialist 
economies, Proceedings o f  the National Tax Association, Willamsburg, Virginia.
McLure, C. E. Jr. (1992). A simpler consumption-based alternative to the income tax for socialist 
economies in transition, The World Bank Research Observer, 7(2): 221-237.
McLure, C. E. Jr. (1995a). New tax code streamlines Kazakh tax system, Tax Notes International, 
11(2): 69-70.
McLure, C. E. Jr. (1995b). Tax impediments to business in three countries in transition from socialism, 
Tax Policy in Central Europe (C. E. McLure, Jr., A. Senijen, T. Baczko, J. Fiszer, and L. Venys, 
eds.), Institute for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco.
McLure, C. E. Jr. (1997). “Tax Holidays and Investment Incentives: A Comparative Analysis," mimeo­
graph, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, California.
McLure, C. E. Jr, J. Martinez-Vazquez, and S. Wallace (1997). Fiscal Transition in Katakhstan, Asian 
Development Bank, Manila, Philippines.
McLure, C. E. Jr. and G. R. Zodrow (1995). “The Economic Case for Foreign Tax Credits for Cash 
Flow Taxes,” mimeograph.
McLure, C. E. Jr. and G. R. Zodrow (1996a). A hybrid approach to the direct taxation of consumption, 
Frontiers o f  Tax Reform (M. Boskin, ed.), Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, 
California, pp. 70-90.
McLure, C. E. Jr. and G. R. Zodrow (1996b). A hybrid consumption-based direct tax proposed for 
Bolivia, International Tax an d  Public Finance, 3- 97-112.
Messere, K. (1995). Taxation in ten industrialized countries over the last decade: An overview, Tax 
Notes International, 11(8): 512-535.
Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation (1996). “Report on Fiscal Policy," mimeograph. Moscow.
Muten, L. (1992). Income tax reform, Fiscal Policies in Economies in Transition (V. Tanzi, ed.), 
International Monetary Foundation, Washington D.C.
